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The 1997 Asian financial crisis that hit Southeast and East Asian 
countries began in Thailand with the devaluation of the Thai Bath, which 
spread a sudden panic to neighboring countries, included South Korea and 
Indonesia. Thus, it caused a loss of market confidence and led to a massive 
capital outflow from Korea and Indonesia. Governments in both countries 
responded by requesting for International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance 
which was followed by several economic recovery prescriptions focusing on 
macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal, banking system and management 
improvement plans, and corporate restructuring initiatives. The IMF plan 
was created to restore market confidence and return the countries to a state 




were very different and had different impacts on both countries‟ economic 
and political conditions. After a three-year period of policies 
implementation, South Korea showed more positive results and recovered 
faster than Indonesia. In comparison to South Korea, the impact of the IMF 
programs in Indonesia was slow, and even to this day the country has not 
been able to recover from all the aftereffects of the crisis.  
There is scholarly debate on the causes of this issue, but this paper 
will analyze deeply the obstacles and differences between South Korean and 
Indonesia‟s experiences in regards to implementation of IMF programs and 
why did they differ, using the framework of institutional capacity and good 
governance on the economic development in such crisis. From this thesis, 
we can see that Indonesia faced several difficulties and challenges due to its 
political transition which induced by social and political instability, that 
influenced the capacity and capability of its new and weak cabinet, caused 
the new governance system to be unable to restore its economic downturn. 
This will further validate the theory of institutional capacity and good 
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The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis started in Thailand with the collapse of the 
Thai Baht;
1
 it turned market sentiment against the region and it spread to 
other Southeast and East Asian countries, including Indonesia and South 
Korea. In fact, these two nations had enjoyed rapid economic growth before 
the crisis had occurred. South Korea was one of the most rapidly developing 
economies in the world at that time, showing an incredible amount of 
economic growth over three or four decades. Indicative of this was the fact 
that Korea had raised its annual income from 80 USD in 1960 to 10.000 
USD in 1996.
2
 However, the impressive economic  
South Korea whose the economy was dependent on the Chaebols, 
the businesses and and the small families of owners of industrial 
conglomerates who almost exclusively control all the industries of South 
Korea, such as Chung Ju Yung of Hyundai, Lee Byung Chul of Samsung, 
Kim Woo Choong of Daewoo and Koo in Hwoi of Lucky-Goldstar. They 
had earned not only billions of dollars for themselves but also for thousands 
of Korean employees and for the economy itself. Unwittingly, it made the 
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Korean economy more vulnerable and dependent on those businesses. In the 
latter, when the crisis influenced the Korean economy, the investors in 
Korea lost their confidence and it cause the abrupt loss of capital flow as 
foreign banks refused to finance the economy and a massive withdrawal of 
foreign investors and their capital began. As the result, 11 Chaebols 
collapsed in 1997, and 10 more out of 50 largest Chaebols were at risk of 
bankruptcy. Bankrupt businesses cost South Korea 100 billion USD, 20% of 
the country‟s half-trillion-dollar economy.
3
 The bankruptcy of the Chaebols 
was shocking to all economists in the country, increasing the unemployment 
rate in a short of period of time. In the automaker business, Kia was one of 
the biggest auto car producers that also experienced the pain of the financial 
crisis and ultimately collapsed with 10.7 billion USD of debt,
4
 which put 
60,000 jobs in jeopardy. 
The devaluation of the Korean won pushed its value down as it 
reached 1,900 KRW per USD. In November 1997, the value of the won was 
900 KRW per $1. It began to decrease even after the end of November 1997. 
As a consequence, more than 30% of Korean people dropped below the 
poverty line as a direct impact of the financial crisis that time. A significant 
number of Korean businesses became insolvent, which subsequently 
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constrained the companies‟ ability to recruit and led to redundancies as 
unemployment figures rose. 
A similar situation occurred in Indonesia; this nation achieved a 
remarkable economic performance 30 years before the crisis. However, 
despite this impressive achievement, and the high-level of economic growth 
in the short-term, poverty reduction and maintenance of its macroeconomic 
stability, Indonesia was also suffering from a vulnerable banking system, 
balance of payment structure and several other weaknesses. These 
conditions had been worsening since the crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. After 
markets had lost confidence in the Indonesian economy, it suffered from 
huge and sudden capital outflows. Investors‟ panic caused creditors to ask to 
repay debts that led to severe capital account deficit. 
Indonesia's per capita income had reached 1,155 USD in 1996 and 
was 1,088 USD in early 1997, but it dropped to 610 USD in 1998. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) claimed that two thirds of the 
Indonesian population was in a very poor condition in 1999.
5
   The 
Indonesian currency, the rupiah, had been devalued by 90%. From January 
23-26, 1998, the value of the rupiah dropped to over 14,000 IDR per 1 
USD,
6
 and the exchange rate, which had been around 2300 IDR to 1 USD, 
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dropped to over 17,000 IDR to 1 USD.
7
 Home industries collapsed, as 
people were not able to earn money or pay for their basic daily needs. The 
1997 financial crisis was the worst economic crisis Indonesia had 
experienced since its independence from Japan in 1945, for the Korean 
government the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was also the worst national 
disgrace since the Korean War in the early 1950s even though this economic 
downturn was not the only crisis ever hit both nations. 
In order to overcome the crisis, South Korea and Indonesia both had 
no other choice but to request assistance from the IMF. Indonesia officially 
made its request on November 5, 1997, and in Korean case, the Executive 
Board of the IMF approved its request on December 3, 1997, thus Korea 
and the IMF signed a three year Stand-By Arrangement, to address the 
fundamental causes of its current financial difficulties, thereby restoring and 
sustaining market confidence and returning the economy to a path of strong 
sustainable growth.
8
 The IMF's executive board approved a three-year 
stand-by arrangement of almost 21 billion USD,
9
 and included loans from 
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Bank of America, Chase, 
Citibank, Japanese Sanwa Bank, Deutsche Bank and some others became a 
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total 58,2 billion USD, the largest rescue in the history of the Korean 
economy.  
This loan plan was designed under the emergency financing 
mechanism of the IMF and contained a package of economic recovery 
programs. Korea agreed to address the IMF initiatives to build a strong 
macroeconomic as well as a comprehensive strategy to improve financing 
and corporate structure. The IMF recommendation was focused on 
tightening macroeconomics through a high interest rates policy to restore 
the confidence of investors and creditors to return to the market. The 
government of Korea started to struggle to persuade foreign creditors to roll-
over short-term debt, meanwhile the IMF also recommended that the 
government restructure its financial sectors and restructure their severe 
merchant banks. One of problems that triggered the financial crisis in Korea 
was the banking system that was full of corruption and coalition with the 
groups of leveraged Chaebols.  
The IMF program‟s implementation in South Korea led to many 
changes. Macroeconomic fundamentals improved and the economy‟s 
vulnerability to a balance of payments crisis was sharply reduced. 
Unemployment was reduced during three-year stand-by arrangement with 
the IMF that expired on December 3, 2000. As well as this, exports 
developed strongly; foreign reserves were built to record levels, and foreign 
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direct investments increased markedly.
10
 The Korean government was 
successful in restructuring their corporate and governance systems by 
presenting five main guidelines for Chaebols reform in January 1998. They 
were (1) enhancement of the transparency of business management, (2) 
ending mutual debt guarantees between affiliate companies, (3) 
improvement of financial structure, (4) reducing the core business areas 
large conglomerates and encouraging their cooperative ties with SMEs, and 
(5) increasing the responsibility of controlling shareholders and its 
management.
11
 The Korean government was also following the programs of 
the IMF by liberating its trade system to adjust to the international standard. 
Like South Korea, Indonesia was implementing the same rescue 
package from the IMF by imposing high interest rate, restructuring the 
banking system and restoring the troubled-banks, the Fund recommended 
the Indonesian government to restructure corporate financial and corporate 
sectors and several other crisis rescue programs. The focus of the economic 
prescription of the IMF was on restoring market confidence and stabilizing 
the Indonesian Rupiah through tight monetary and fiscal policies. As well as 
this, another was to achieve a strong economic performance through several 
IMF-designed programs to build a healthy financial sector by adopting an 
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international standard for its banking management system and closing 
troubled banks.  
However, the recoveries in the two countries were very different and 
had different effects on the two nations‟ economic and political conditions. 
In comparison to South Korea, the impact of the IMF programs in Indonesia 
seemed to be very slow, and to this day the country has not been able to 
recover from all the aftereffects of the crisis. Particularly after the 
government of Indonesia imposed high rate interest from 20% to 80% per 
annum, causing many small and medium businesses to not be able to be 
productive, because of high production costs and more than a doubling of 
prices for all products in the market, including oil and other basic goods. 
Thus, followed by a devaluation of the Rupiah, dramatically caused the 
Indonesian people to slump to an even worse level of poverty.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
Since the financial crisis hit in the middle of 1997, both the 
Indonesian and South Korean governments were addressing all programs 
from the IMF, however South Korea seemed to show much better result. 
Even though some programs had several weaknesses, the IMF-supported 
programs were very successful in restoring confidence and stabilizing the 
financial market, and also in laying the foundation for a sustained recovery 
 
 ８ 
in the real economy and lowering the chances of future crises.
12
 The 
banking restructuring reduced the risk management system after the 
program was accomplished as bank management is placing an increased 
emphasis on profitability rather than asset growth.
13
 
On the other hand, the IMF implementation programs seemed to 
show that the financial crisis that hit Indonesian was not due to its crisis, but 
it happened as the result of aspects of the economic system in Indonesia 
were wrongly built and had been so for several decades prior to the crisis. 
Indonesia was facing a downturn of economic condition that threatened to 
deteriorate fiscal strength and the IMF had already suggested Indonesia to 
cut expenditure and generate 1% GDP budget surplus of fiscal for a year. 
Nevertheless, this suggestion caused a huge collapse in domestic aggregate 
demand in 1998; the economy of Indonesia was leading to a more severe 
crisis.  
The crisis not only affected the Indonesian economy, but it also 
triggered its political instability. As the government was seen to not be able 
to deal with the chaos of economic decline, opposition parties emerged to 
take chance to topple the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto, and 
roused the demand of democracy. Politicians and democratic activists 
enforced the government to change its political and governmental system in 
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a more democratic way, turmoil occurred in almost all the territories of 
Indonesia, creating social and political instability, causing the economic 
recovery to be even more difficult to achieve. The dictatorship of Soeharto 
regime for more than 30 years left Indonesia with an extreme amount of 
debt and poor corporate governance system. The success of the IMF 
recovery package was dependent of highly support of its government and its 
institutional parliaments; however, as they were new and had little 
experience dealing with the crumbled economic and political crises, 
Indonesia was unable to overcome its entire crisis even though they applied 
the same rescue suggestions from the IMF. 
Therefore, in order to explain the past and to suggest to Indonesia in 
the future a real policy action and not only a discourse, the main research 
question of this thesis are: what are the obstacles and differences between 
South Korean and Indonesia‟s experience with regards to the 
implementation of the IMF programs and why did they differ? This research 
is looking at descriptions of the situation before the crisis, what triggered the 
crisis – to be able to clearly analyze the IMF programs‟ implementations in 
the two countries – and why the two differed in terms of recovery time. 
Here, this thesis focuses on the recovery of their economies from the crisis 
up to today, using indicators like their respective currency values, 
unemployment rates, poverty lines, GDP and all of which should be better 
than before crisis.  
 
 １０ 
This research question of this thesis is very important because it can 
contribute to international political economy in two ways: (1) academically, 
this research can look a new set of comparative case studies on certain 
policies that can result in different outcomes. Here, I chose Korea as a 
comparison case for Indonesia, the case selection for this thesis was very 
difficult and challenging because there are many differences between Korea 
and Indonesia that can make case selection for this thesis not clear. South 
Korea is different from Indonesia not only in the size of its territory and 
population, but also South Korea is a quite homogenous country while 
Indonesia has more than hundreds of ethnic groups that make Indonesia to 
be immensely heterogeneous. Looking at their cultures, South Korea and 
Indonesia have various contrasts to each other, mainly in the language, life 
style, and religion. In the economic sector, these two nations also have 
plentiful of dissimilarities. South Korea which the economy is developed 
through industrial businesses different from Indonesia, that its economy is 
based on agriculture and tourism.  
 However the paper argues that if we narrow down to some aspects 
in the sector of economics and politics, this is reasonable to compare South 
Korea and Indonesia and thus choose them for being researched in this issue. 
South Korea and Indonesia both were very poor countries however these 
two nations experienced similar economic changes several decades before 
its economic crisis hit, mainly after 1980. The economic growth of South 
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Korea started to increase and develop rapidly. Same as Korea, Indonesia 
also showed an impressive economic growth and reached its remarkable 
economic achievement by poverty reduction and its export rate. These 
countries‟ economies were dependent on the export sectors that made their 
economies vulnerable and susceptible to any shocks from outside of the 
countries. Another similarity between South Korea and Indonesia that time 
which was one of the causes that triggered the 1997-1998 financial crisis is 
not only Korea that had problem with the ties among big groups of 
industrial business holders, chaebols with its government; but also 
Indonesian economy was really fragile because of President Soeharto‟s 
family and friends network in almost all national businesses.  
This is also the reason why this paper doesn‟t take Thailand which 
also suffered from its currency crisis in 1997, because there are not enough 
similarities that can make Thailand could be compared for this case. Besides 
that, only South Korea and Indonesia that were suffering from the foreign 
debts and current account deficit due to the relations of governments and 
business conglomerates. If we focus more on their banking and corporate 
system, these two nations was suffering from banking and corporate 
structure. The government of South Korea and Indonesia gave a special 
privilege for chaebols and Soeharto‟s allies to get free access to finance 
them and let the foreign banks to lend their money easily that turned out to 
be the crucial cause of 1997-1998 crises in both states. Different with 
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Thailand that hit by the crisis due to the speculative activities particularly on 
the real estate lending
14
, the main cause of the crisis in Korea and Indonesia 
was the escalation of foreign debts in several years prior to the crisis. 
Foreign debts in Korea rose from 44 billion USD to 120 billion USD with 
67% of its short-term in nature.
15
 Like Korea, the foreign debts in Indonesia 
increased double to triple during the same years that made the economy of 
its country become very vulnerable.
16
 Therefore, with all of these 
similarities, this thesis determined to choose South Korea and Indonesia to 
be compared in the term of their economic recovery through the IMF 
prescriptions not only because both countries are victims of the systemic 
impact of the financial crisis in Asia and adopted IMF policies to resolve the 
crisis. Thus, this paper will try to find the reason that leads to different 
outcomes of the economic performances of South Korea and Indonesia after 
the two nations have implemented the recovery package of the IMF 
programs.  
Furthermore, even though there are many researches tried to explore 
The Asian Financial Crisis in such countries, there are no many research 
that comparatively analyzes both countries deeply from the aspect of its 
recovery process related to IMF programs from a political, policy-relevant 
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and political channel perspective on the capacity of institutional foundation 
and through the theory of good governance. Most research only examines 
on causes and recovery progresses without drawing conclusive comparisons 
between the two nations. (2) Realistically, through this research I would also 
like to provide a deeper understanding of the crisis so that it can provide 
lessons on how to prevent a similar occurrence as well as give some 
suggestions and solutions for countries facing such a crisis in the future. 
Learning from other countries‟ experiences will help states‟ decision makers 
to avoid such mistakes and make better decision for their economics. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
The differences in performance in the implementation of IMF policies in 
South Korea and Indonesia were mainly due to:  
1. A difference in the South Korean and Indonesian government’s 
capacity and capability in addressing policy had a significant 
influence to the success of policy implementation. 
Compared to South Korea, the Indonesian government did not have the 
capacity and capability to adjust an appropriate policy in order to restore its 
market confidence and recover from its economic downturn. The concept of 
government‟s capacity should be described as a bureaucratic efficiency that 
demonstrates the government‟s leadership in a certain condition, while its 
capability can show how the ability of such governments in accommodating 
the changes, which in this case is how the ability of such governments could 
 
 １４ 
create a good economic performance by identifying problems and choosing 
the most appropriate and effective policies in resolving the economic crisis. 
The Indonesian government also had a low commitment to the economic 
growth that led Indonesia to have a worse crisis.  The IMF programs that 
previous government dealt with confused new governments since their 
capability to address those policies was low. However, the Korean 
government showed a good level of capacity, capability and a high 
commitment to create a strong economic crisis recovery team, while Kim 
Dae-Jung‟s plans also called for a prolonged period of economic recovery 
team, the first stage of which would involve „close, cooperative‟ relations 
while maintaining two different systems, states, military structures and 
foreign policies. His team worked rapidly to overcome the devaluation of 
the won and the debt problem by implementing the four main programs 
mandated by the IMF. In the end, Kim Dae-jung was able to overcome the 
foreign exchange crisis in 1997.  
 
2. The fact that the IMF programs were much more strict in 
Indonesia than in Korea had a significant influence to the 
success of policy implementation. 
There were several programs that were very strict for the Indonesian 
economic condition of that time - such as banking sector restructuring, a 
tight monetary policy, military reform, constitution reform and almost one 
hundred amendments that the IMF recommended to Indonesia. For the 
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monetary policy, the IMF requested the Indonesian governments to increase 
almost 80% of interest rate that led domestic businesses to collapse, not only 
causing the rising of unemployment rate, but also sent the Indonesian people 
to live under poverty line where people were not able to buy even ordinary 
products. In Korea, the IMF only suggested Korea to raise its interest rate to 
almost 30% which was not as strict as the IMF recovery program compared 
in Indonesia. Besides that, for the banking restructuring program, previously, 
there was only one bank in Indonesia that had been closed by the 
government in the history of Indonesia, but after the IMF forced 
governments to close more than fifteen banks simultaneously, banking 
confidence dropped, people could not trust the investment and bank 
capability of the institutions, which had caused high inflation as consumer 
confidence decreased and led to a more difficult crisis.  In Korea after 
restructuring their banking system, President Kim Dae Jung forced out 
insolvent financial institutions and the Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank 
were nationalized. As well as this, all troubled banks were given time and 
funds to rehabilitate, themselves and it led their banking system to improve 
in terms of efficiency, risk management and helped to create a market and 
banking confidence not only domestically but also internationally, helped to 




3. The issues of political transition in democratization period had a 
significant influence in the government’s capability and in 
resulting impacts of the IMF policy implementation. 
In Indonesia, the democracy process led to the emergence of many new 
parliaments and parties, made the decision making process more difficult 
and took a much longer time. Sudden democratization caused significant 
and radical demonstrations all over the country, after the 32-year-long 
dictatorship of President Soeharto collapsed; the new government had to 
deal with instability in the political environment, which frequently 
hampered the effort of the national government to solve or manage the risks 
of the economic crisis, and led the recovery very slow. However, 
democratization in Korea occurred several years before the crisis hit its 
country and it actually helped the country to be closer to global economy as 
it encouraged more export and investments. Checks and balances in the 
system were improving at a government level and companies-related levels 
during democratization in Korea and in the crisis. This condition is related 
to the ability of new governments to rapidly fix the economic destruction 
and create significant improvement, choosing the right programs, and 
maintaining a recovery process. In the case of Indonesia, during the Asian 
financial crisis, more than four new leaders came and left the presidential 
office. Very radical changes after the military authoritarian leadership led to 
an inexperienced cabinet with a lack of knowledge and understanding of 
economics and weak leaders that threaten the implementation of IMF plans. 
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All of these conditions influenced capacity and capability of Indonesian 
government in making crucial decisions during the crisis. However in Korea, 
there was no extreme political transition during the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crises.  
 
1.4 Methodology and Resources 
The comparative research method in social science is simply 
described as a method that tries to compare two or more things with a view 
to discover a social phenomenon. This thesis will also focus on explaining 
the comparative case studies based on a descriptive analytic method, a 
research methodology that looks at a particular phenomenon in order to 
explain the aspects relevant to the observed phenomena, describing the 
characteristics and various aspects of the subject.
17
 Here, I am trying to 
answer what brought South Korea and Indonesia into crisis in order to give 
a clear description of what exactly happened during the years directly before 
and after the crisis and what made the economic performances in the two 
nations were very different. I base this paper on the qualitative research of 
reliable data that can show the result of economic and political changes due 
to the implications of the IMF policies.  
The difference between the comparative and the non-comparative 
wings of social science lies more in the range of variation considered that in 
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  As Przeworski and Teune point out, “if we 
accept the residual nature of names of social systems, we can then attempt to 
replace these names by variables. When we find that societies differ with 
regard to a particular characteristic, we can ask what it is about these 
societies that cause differences.”
19
   Based on this understanding, this thesis 
is trying to explain why similar programs could give different outcomes 
when applied in different cultures, societies, and economic and political 
conditions. It will also analyze why, even though both countries 
implemented IMF policies, the results were different.  
This thesis will not only contribute to the academic field related to 
financial crises in Indonesia and Korea due to the historical description and 
the data that can distinguish the differences between Korea and Indonesia in 
the terms of the IMF programs, but also this thesis can be useful to 
understand such crises and find better solutions for the future. 
The resources that are used in this thesis were collected from those 
related to the issue of financial crisis and its recovery in South Korea and 
Indonesia. All resources that were used to answer my research question are 
based on the statements and documents from the IMF reports and the 
individuals, researchers and governments, as well as related books, 
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newspapers, papers, data, files and journals. The resources of this thesis 
consist of: 
 Economic resources, such as papers, books, research files, and 
journals from other scholars, IMF reports, the World Bank, some 
international institutions,  the Korea Banks, and the Bank of 
Indonesia. 
 Official government statements and documents. 
 Media sources: New York Times, National Geographic, the 
Economists, Korea Joongang Daily, Chosun Ilbo, Kompas 
Newspaper, Kompasiana etc. 
 Books, draft papers and websites related to IMF Programs, recovery 
from the crisis in Korea and Indonesia. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis will consist of six chapters; chapter two will provide 
several views of other scholars who have been researched in the 1997-1998 
financial crises in both nations. This paper will elaborate what other 
scholars tried to answer about what triggered the crisis in South Korea and 
Indonesia, how the IMF programs were implemented during those period. I 
will also explore some concepts that are related to this issue in order to give 
a clearer answer of why South Korea and Indonesia seemed to show very 
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different result in addressing the rescue package from the IMF. The 
concepts that this paper will provide are institutions and institutional 
capacity as well as good governance. 
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In the chapter three, the crisis and political power, this paper will 
give some description of the history before and during the crisis occurred. I 
will also provide some data that can show the political situation in Korea 
and Indonesia during the implementation of the IMF programs. Chapter 
three will give a clear picture of how the power transition process happened 
in the two nations, and how it influenced the process and progress of the 
adjustment reforms of IMF programs. 
Chapter four will provide more facts and data about Korea‟s and 
Indonesia‟s reform, not only in the economic reform, but also in its political 
reforms with its focus on the governments‟ capacity and capability in 
addressing the IMF policies. How economic reform started, what kind of 
economic reforms that Korea and Indonesia did in order to overcome the 
huge crisis in 1997. How the IMF prescription programs were implemented 
in the companies, societies and also corporate sectors based on both 
governments‟ ability. This chapter will look at every IMF program 
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implemented during the period of agreement between the government of 
South Korea and the IMF and also Indonesia and the IMF. What the 
governments of two nations did to reform its political system will also be 
elaborated in this chapter.  
The next chapter will discuss why both countries have different 
results in implementing the same rescue package from the IMF. This 
chapter will show what factors influenced the impact and results of the 
implementation IMF programs. This chapter will be divided into two 
sections, the first will provide comparison of the reform progress from both 
states, and the second section will give comparison of their economic 
recovery, with several economic indications, I will try to show the 
differences between the economic recovery in Korea and Indonesia after the 
three-year Stand-by Arrangement was accomplished. The last chapter will 
give a conclusion of this paper, what triggered the crisis, how the 
implementation programs were addressed in both states, how the reforms in 
the economic and political system in South Korea and Indonesia during that 
time were enacted and what made the result of the implementation of the 
IMF programs in Korea and Indonesia to be very different even though both 






II. Literature Review 
 
In analyzing both countries‟ IMF policy implementation processes, 
This paper will utilize the concepts of “institutional capacity”, “good 
governance” and “economic development” in order to gain a clear picture of 
the crises to find the answers of my research question. Many scholars have 
conducted and published research on the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, its 
causes and the implementation and role of IMF, terms of institutions, and 
even researches on governance. Yet, not many have researched on the 
government‟s capacity as the institution responsible for appropriate policy 
decision-making.  
Not many have combined the concepts of institutional capacity and 
good governance principles that can influence economic policy related to 
IMF implementation programs. Most scholars are concerned with nations‟ 
economic conditions that led to such crisis. But this paper focuses on the 
cause of success and failure of the economic recovery on the comparative 
method between the case of Korea‟s and Indonesia‟s recovery on IMF 
policy implementation that also include the socio-political aspects such as 
democracy and institutional capacity. Politicians and economists claim that 





2.1.1 Institution and Institutional Capacity 
Many social science scholars use the concept of institution as 
government. Therefore we must understand what institution is and why it is 
really important to the result of government decisions and policies. However, 
institution is often discussed without being defined at all, or after having 
defined only casually. Robert Keohane asserts that institution may refer to a 
general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-
constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.
20
 When we 
speak about a country, institution is its government itself. Institution 
involves persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that 
prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectation. 
 Douglass North defines institutions as „rules, enforcement 
characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human 
interaction.”
21
 He adds that institutions can bring a positive line to economic 
growth. The ideas of the importance of institutions emerged from neo-
institutional scholars such as Mancur Olsen and Douglass North; several 
cross-national empirical studies have found a positive relationship between 
the quality of institution and governance structure and economic growth.
22
 It 
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is not only them who believe that a good institution can build and improve 
an economic growth in their countries, many other scholars such as Mauro 
also agrees with this statement. He argues that if one state wants to increase 
its nation‟s economic growth, the leader needs to protect and improve his 
institution in the beginning stage. 
 Alternatively, a significant number of studies discredited the 
relations between institution and economic growth. Some claim the new 
political economy of growth still lacks a proper grasp of channel through 
which institutions affect growth, and of the political sources of good 
institutions. The skeptical school believes that there is no systematic 
between democracy, institutions and economic development.
23
 
 Besides institutions, a significant number of international relations 
scholars have studied institutional capacity. The concept of institutional 
capacity itself sheds light on the broader notion of capacity. Institutions are 
not only a discrete organization like government agencies. Capacity is also 
required in all phases of the policy process: for instance, a strong monitoring 
and reviewing system are needed to enhance the effectiveness of any 
policy.
24
 Thus institutional capacity according to Stephnne Willems 
represents an “enabling environment” that can show how the process of 
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such institutions‟ policies can be sustained over time. Institution and 
institutional capacity may play a key role in the process of creating good 




Nevertheless, not many scholars have recognized that politics and 
institutions play a really big role in economic growth. Furthermore, the 
UNDP has stated that institution- or capacity-building, making 
improvements in an organization's ability to carry out appropriate tasks 
requires improvements in the ability to identify problems, consider the 
alternatives available, formulate effective policies, and implement and 
sustain activities appropriate to give effect to the socio-economic 
development.
26
 Alesia demonstrates that institutional quality, as measured 
by bureaucratic efficiency, absence of corruption, protection of property 
rights, and the rule of law, is important for growth.
27
 Other interesting 
research by Chong and Calderon, applying a more rigorous approach to 
causality, found strong evidence of causation running in both directions: 
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2.1.2 Good Governance 
Research on governance and its relations to economic growth 
exploded in the last couple of decades; hundreds of scholars have been 
trying to explore the correlation between governance and economic 
development. A growing literature stresses that governance, broadly defined 
as the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in 
a country, matter to economic development as Kaufmann mentions.
29
 He 
also believes that there is no doubt that per capita income and the quality of 
governance are strongly positively correlated across countries. Before we go 
too far, we better understand the definition of governance at first. 
Governance according to OECD, governance denotes “the use of political 
authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management 
of its resources for social and economic development.
30
 It describes how 
government manages and controls his citizens, social welfare, economic 
growth, military defense etc. 
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The UN Secretary-General claims that good governance is “ensuring 
respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; 
promoting transparency and capacity in public administration”. Governance 
will consist of the process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing 
governments, the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and 
deliver public services and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. 
In “The IMF, Good Governance and Middle-Income Countries” by 
Ben Thirkell-White it is mentioned that good governance has the potential 
to enhance market confidence in a context of increasingly liberalized capital 
account.
31
 Another scientist adds that a government that has the ability to be 
good at governance must know how to improve the management of the 
public sector resources‟ and support the development and maintenance of a 
transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment.
32
 
On the other hand, poor governance is defined as government 
inability to control such problems inside the country. International financial 
institutions argued that corruption and cronyism had made these non-
democratic regimes vulnerable to financial breakdown.
33
 Therefore during 
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the crises in 1997-1998, in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia middle 
class-based societal movements have tried to topple democratic leaders in 
the name of better governance. However, it led debates about the 
governance have also resulted political instability. Then the governments 
that failed to deliver rapid economic growth were disliked even if they were 
legitimated by democratic vote.
34
 
2.1.3 Economic Development 
There is significant literature on economic development in 
international studies; many scholars describe economic development as the 
increasing of nation‟s wealth and improvement of people‟s quality of life. 
David A. Sampson, a secretary of Economic Development of US Economic 
Development of Commerce describes economic development as a process 
that influences growth and restructuring of an economy to enhance the 
economic wellbeing of a community.
35
 In an international relations sense, 
economic development encompasses three major areas. Other scholar such 
as Adam Smith in his book „The Wealth of Nations‟ emphasize the need for 
economic development through different types of production. He explains 
how governments can create functions in the market and points out the role 
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of self-interest. He believes that the importance of markets is the 
fundamental of nation‟s economic development. 
Firstly, policies that a government undertakes to meet broad 
economic objectives including inflation control, high employment, and 
sustainable growth. A government is the actor that should be responsible for 
making decisions related to control inflation rates in its country and creates 
a large number of employment opportunities for their citizens to provide a 
sustainable growth to their economy. 
 Secondly, policies and programs to provide services, including 
building highways, public facilities, such as schools, higher educations and 
health facilities. Thirdly, policies and programs explicitly directed at 
improving the business climate through specific efforts, business finance, 
marketing, neighborhood development, business retention and expansion, 
technology transfer and other developments.  
 
2.2 Reviews on Asian Financial Crisis Literature 
Since the financial crisis hit Asia in 1997 and caused the economic 
collapse of many countries, attention for this huge sudden crisis exploded 
from all over the world. Most economists and political scientists focused on 
what triggered the crisis and how governments struggled to solve this 
problem. Here, I will focus on such reviews about how the implementation 
of IMF programs in Korea and Indonesia occurred. 
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2.2.1 IMF Implementation in Korea 
With a sudden surge of economic crash and collapse of consecutive 
bankruptcies of several large of Korean industrial conglomerates, the so-
called Chaebols, it was inevitable that this subject has been discussed and 
explored by many scholars. Most of scholars believe that the decision to 
request the fund from the IMF was the best choice for the Korean 
government to solve such problems; weakened investor confidence in Korea, 
Korea‟s foreign exchange reserves were almost depleted, number of 
unemployment increased and etc. There was no choice except to ask for a 
rescue package from the International Monetary Fund. Scholars such as 
David T. Coe and Se-Ji Kim agreed with IMF rescue programs in Korea at 
that time. 
The Korean government agreed to the five Letters of Intent for 
economic restructuring programs, dated from December 3, 1997. From the 
outbreak of the crisis the Korean government prioritized rescheduling 
Korea‟s short-term external debts and stabilizing the foreign exchange 
market as the top policy objective. The IMF implementation programs were 
focusing on: restructuring their macroeconomic policy and increasing their 
rate policy; restructuring the financial sector such as banking by 
strengthening regulations and information as well as its transparency; 
corporate restructuring and its corporate government restructuring; 
improving trade liberalization together with its capital account liberalization. 
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YunJong Wang and Hyoungsoo Zang assert that since the Korean 
government has focused on attracting foreign capital to resolve the 
currencies crisis at hand, as a result, a usable reserves increased from under 
USD 7 billion at the end of November 1997, when the currency crisis had 
reached its critical point, to USD 37.04 billion as of the end of June 1998.
36
 
They believe it the surplus of foreign reserve is the combined result of the 
USD 25 billion support from international financial institution and a current 
account surplus, which has been continuously growing since November 
1997 as the Korean government followed the recommendation of the IMF 
programs. 
Other scholars, Ajai Chopra, Kenneth Kang and Anthony Richards, 
have concluded that the recovery in 1999 and 2000, with average growth of 
10 percent per year, was also much faster and steeper than expected, and the 
large output gap was closed by late 1999 were all caused by IMF 
implementations.
37
 To facilitate economic restructuring, Korea stepped up 
its trade liberalization plans by promoting the following issues in 
accordance with the WTO concession plan, abolishing trade-related 
subsidies such as abolishing restrictions on 25 imports in December 1997 
under the Import Diversification Act. Some economists mentioned that, 
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However, some scholars also argued that the restructuring of the 
banking sector and trade liberalization were not necessary for Korea at that 
time. Paul Krugman states that the Korean government also made several 
mistakes as they adopted a high interest rates and a tight monetary policy, 
which set domestic interest rates far above those of the world market, and 





2.2.2 IMF Implementation in Indonesia 
Indonesia was also one of the states that experienced the crisis; this 
encouraged many scholars to explore the financial crisis in that country. 
Some scholars believe that Indonesia could not escape from the economic 
crisis in 1997 due to the economic problems that were very complicated and 
had been entrenched in the Indonesian economy for decades. Other 
researchers argue that Indonesia was hit by this crisis due to its dependency 
on international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and 
others.  
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Like Korea, Indonesia also requested the rescue package from the 
International Monetary Fund after it suffered a reserve net-capital outflow of 
more than $13.8 billion in 1998. The Indonesian government signed a three-
year Stand-by arrangement for almost $10 billion after the IMF‟s executive 
board approved the request on November 5, 1997.
40
 In Indonesia, similar 
programs from the IMF were adjusted. The government of Indonesia created 
The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to rescue the 
Indonesian banking system. However, many scholars believe that the IMF 
programs were not appropriate for Indonesia‟s economic and political 
condition of that time. It did not lead to a better recovery, but it created 
more problems for Indonesia in the sectors of politics and economy.  
Scholars like Rizal Ramli, argue that involving the IMF in 
Indonesia‟s recovery program would inevitably plunge the country into a 
deeper economic crisis, adding, “I felt that it was more likely that the IMF 
would act as surgeon rather than savior, severing limbs from the Indonesian 
economy and sending the country a large bill for its services.
41
 Following 
the IMF suggestions, Indonesia must convert the private debt into public 
debt, whereas prior to the crisis Indonesia had no domestic public sector 
debt, under IMF policies the government‟s domestic debt swelled to US$65 
billion. Meanwhile, the public sector international debt rose from US$54 to 
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$74 billion. As a consequence of the financial crisis and IMF policies, 
Indonesia‟s debt doubled over a period of just four years. 
Others also agreed with this statement, economists and politicians 
such as Stephen Granville and Sri Mulyani Indrawati asserted that the IMF 
programs and its policies did not work well for Indonesia. The IMF arrived 
and suggested several policies including the structuring of corporate 
governance. The impact was a more fragile government system that led to 
big demonstrations, complete with political instability that caused more 
complicated economic troubles.
42
 Sri Mulyani Indrawati, the former 
Ministry of Economy of Indonesia who is currently a Managing Director of 
the World Bank argues that the IMF plan was designed to regain and restore 
the market by imposing wide-ranging programs, but the designated recovery 
steps are not without criticism.
43
 Not little number of economists and 
politicians believe that the IMF programs were not suitable for Indonesia 
that time.  
However several other scholars argue that because of IMF fund, 
Indonesia did not experience worst condition. The impact of the collapse of 
investors‟ confidence spread out to not only on an economic level for the 
people in Indonesia, however the stability of government dictatorship of 
Soeharto in 1998. Even though some programs seemed to not show a 
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positive result for the recovery, Steven Radelet believes that without help 
from International Monetary Fund, Indonesia that time would not be able to 
recover at any level.
44
 However, there is no debate on the comparative case 
of Korea and Indonesia in implementing the IMF recovery programs from a 
political, policy-relevant and political channel view on the capacity of the 
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III. The Crisis and Political Power 
3.1 The Crisis and Political Transition in Korea 
Korea‟s rapid growth during the 30 years before the 1997-98 crisis 
was an amazing achievement for the Korean government. Over three 
decades their annual income grew over 8 percent.  South Korea, in the 
1950s, was one of the poorest countries in the world. The GDP of South 
Korea in the 1950s was 1.5 billion USD, which means their per capita was 
only 70 USD in the year 1954. Starting from 1962, the Korean government 
announced its five year plan for economic development of Korea by 
implementation of industrialization projects. This plan was launched in 
order to develop their economic growth and recover from its devastated-
economy after the two Korean brothers‟ war in 1950-1953. After the first 
economic development plan was completed in 1967, increasing exports 
became the keynote of the second five-year development plan.
45
 
The government of South Korea tried to manifest itself in export-
oriented industrialization strategy to compete in the international market; the 
government encouraged domestic businesses to release themselves from 
their dependency with international aid, especially from the United State of 
America. They focused on export promotion and import substitutions which, 
in the end, helped South Korea to increase its GDP and build their economic 
independency. The GDP of Korea increased by 949.7 billion USD and its 
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GDP per capita reached 19.624 USD in the year 2007. However, this rapid 
economic growth that was based on export oriented strategy caused Korea 
to become fragile to any international economic shocks. During their 
industrialization period, Korea experienced rapid income growth, which 
resulted in higher rates of inflation, a loss of international competitiveness, 








The condition of Korea at that time led to many instabilities of its 
economy to any crisis. Yet, this situation became a real disaster, starting 
from July 2
nd
 1997, after Thailand‟s currency Baht devalued and spread its 
sudden shock to other neighboring countries, including Korea. Korea 
quickly lost its market confidence, causing many investors to withdraw all 
its credits. Eleven large Chaebols collapsed in 1997; starting with the 
bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel, as the 14
th
 largest industrial conglomerates in 
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Korea. Hanbo Steel was one of biggest steel producers in Korea; this 
bankruptcy was followed by another steel produce, Sammi Group.  
Not long after its collapse, Jinro, the 19
th
 largest Chaebols, went into 
bankruptcy, and in July 1997, Kia Motor, as the third largest auto maker in 
the country, could not stand this sudden hit and also collapsed with USD 10 
billion of debt. The bankrupt businesses cost South Korea 100 billion USD, 
20% of country‟s half-trillion-dollar economy.
47
 These bankruptcies were 
the biggest loss of Korea in history. 
Before the collapse of Chaebols and its risk of others 50 largest 
Chaebols to experience collapse, the crisis started with a current account 
deficit widened from 2% of its GNP in 1995 to 5% in 1996. The export of 
Korea since the 1960s has been one of the most rapid and successful 
economic growths compared to other states. But it began to slowdown from 
31% to a half, which was 15%, and it led the GNP of South Korea to decline 
from a high level of almost 15% to only 7.1%. This slowdown of Korean 
export was caused by: a loss of Korean currency value due to the drastic 
decline of the Yen, as an impact of recession that happened in Japan and 
Europe.  The world prices in some export products that Korea was focusing 
on, such as in chips, automobile, and computers, also became a reason of the 
export slump. 
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Due to the slowdown of their export, the rate of growth of exports 
fell to an average of 14% annually between 1990 and 1996 as compared to 
20% between 1985 and 1990;
48
 The trade deficit doubled between 1990 and 
1995; while the current account deficit quadrupled. Then, when the currency 
attack on the Korean Won started, Korea made a futile attempt to defend its 
overvalued exchange rate, losing about 20 billion USD in the process. By 
the end of 1997, Korea‟s net usable foreign exchange reserves had dwindled 
to about 12 billion USD,
49
 or about three weeks‟ worth of imports and about 
60% of debt falling due.  
In addition, the devaluation of the won increased the debt burden on 
Korea‟s banks and corporations dramatically.
50
 Following this condition, in 
the early November, won devalued from 844 KRW per 1 USD to 1000 
KRW per 1 USD, and almost reached 2000 KRW per USD in December 




The Korean government did not want to have a long discussion 
regarding the way out of the crisis. There were some policies in the sector of 
economy and politics following the recovery prescription from the 
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International Monetary Fund. The Korean government directly requested the 
rescue packages from IMF for a three year Stand-by arrangement program. 
The purpose of the bailout was to provide a bridging finance to reduce 




Additionally, following the IMF programs of economic recovery, 
Korea had to restructure its corporate governance. One of the causes of the 
crisis in 1997-1998 was the bad governance and its corrupt-relations 
between government and Chaebols. The Korean government was trying to 
clean the government institution and its political relations with Chaebols. In 
order to strengthen the governance of financial institutions many measures 
have been taken. They include allowing foreigners to own commercial 
banks and become bank executives in December 1997 and May 1998, 
respectively, improving governance of financial institutions and 
strengthening the right of commercial bank minority shareholders in January 
2000, raising the limit of bank ownership of domestic actors. 
Nevertheless, there was no political transition from authoritarian 
regimes to democratic ones. Korea experienced the transition from 1987. All 
of the movement of democratic voices appeared during authoritarian 
regimes. Even though they have been through a rapid growth and increased 
its export, Korea was building a very crucial political problem within. It 
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made Korean people thirsty for freedom of speech and for a democratic 
leader. Thousands of people came down to the street to protest against the 
Chun government and to request a direct election for the next president. 
Therefore, in June 29, 1987, the government made an announcement to 
transition to a democracy which included: 1) direct election of president, 2) 
guarantee of human right, 3) guarantee of freedom of speech, 4) local 
autonomy, and 5) securing freedom of political parties.
53
 
Under the new democratic system, there were many positive effects, 
such as human rights improvement, public opinion in policy making, fair 
election and what people hoped since Korea‟s independance day, freedom 
of speech. But, it also created several potential problems for the future. 
Since it turned to be a democratic state, a labor union was built in order to 
protect labor‟s interests. However, the labor union that enhanced labor rights, 
led to very high wage hikes, making Korean wages much higher than other 
countries. Such as in the US during the same period, when Korea increased 
its wage from 9.2% to be 12.7% in 1994, US increased its salary by 0.1%. 
Korean wages even doubled some European countries at that time. As I 
explained above, it finally became one of the reasons of the 1997 financial 
crisis. 
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Under the Roh Tae-woo administration, emphasis on equity and 
balance enhanced the social welfare system through housing policies and the 
national health care plan.
54
 However, the tied relations between 
government-politicians and businessmen caused the vulnerable situation in 
the political and economic sector of Korea. Politicians pressured banks to 
give loans to export oriented business, especially chaebols. Politicians 
helped chaebol gain access to many loans freely and chaebol illegally 
helped the politicians‟ campaigns and contributed to political policies in 
return. To cut the political and business ties, and create a transparent 
transaction, the Kim Young Sam administration adopted the financial 
transaction policies. 
Kim Young Sam was followed by Kim Dae-Jung, who won the 
presidential election and started his official responsibility as the 15
th
 
president of Korea on February 25
th
 1998. The Kim government announced 
the new strict policy regarding the government-business ties. The political 
prescriptions by the IMF strongly recommended the Kim government to 
restructure the chaebol system and ill-performing financial institutions.
55
 
Therefore, during the 1997-1998 financial crises, there was little political 
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instability in Korea. The Government was changed right in the time of the 
presidential election schedule.   
After the Kim Dae-Jung regime, president Roh Moo Hyun continued 
holding the presidential position. He was the fourth president since Korea 
announced its democractic system. He was unexpectedly elected and was a 
different kind of president.
56
 The other two previous presidents had been 
democracy activists.
57
 But this new president was constrained only by the 
boundary of constitutional rights and did not try to control other political 
institutions. During his presidency, he just focused on the economic 
recovery based on IMF recommendation prescriptions. He concentrated to 
continue the policies on economic reform and in the same time kept making 
progress on political reform to clean up the bad governance performance. 
 
3.2 The Crisis and Political Transition in Indonesia 
 The economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997 became a memorable 
event for the Indonesian people. This event devastated the Indonesian 
economy.  A similar condition to Korea also occurred in Indonesia; the 
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crisis started from the devaluation of the Thailand Baht.
58
 From around June 
1997, the crisis spread within months to several countries of the South-East 
Region. Indonesia per capita income had reached 1,155 USD in 1996 and 
was 1,088 USD in early 1997, but it dropped to only 610 USD in 1998.  
From 1990 to 1996, Indonesia‟s recorded annual GDP growth was 7.3%, 
decreased to only 4.5% at the end of 1997, and continued to drop to even a 
mere 0.9% in the year 1999.
59
  
The International Labor Organization (ILO) claimed that two thirds 
of the Indonesian population was in a very poor condition in 1999.
60
 The 
Indonesian currency was suddenly attacked, caused a sudden outflow of 
funds, which was a result of panic behavior of many investors due to the 
devaluation of the Thai Baht.
61
 The Indonesian currency, the Rupiah, was 
devalued by 90%. From January 23-26, 1998, the Value of the Rupiah 
dropped to over 14,000 per USD,
62
 and the exchange rate, which had been 
around 2,300 Rupiah per USD, dropped to over 17,000 per USD.
63
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 Before the crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, Indonesia was one of the 
countries enjoying rapid economic growth. The export and its economic 
development produced reduction in poverty and improvement in social 
welfare indicators, low inflation, a relatively modest current account deficit, 
and growing international currency reserves.  However, the crisis lead 
Indonesia to experience a high rate of unemployment with many Indonesian 
people losing their jobs and ending up in poverty since the prices of goods 
and services increased double and even dramatically increased triple.  
 Indonesia now is much more vulnerable to any economic shocks 
than, say, thirty years ago, for a number of reasons.
64
 First, since economic 
reforms started in the 1980s toward trade, banking, investment, and capital 
account liberalizations, the Indonesian economy has become more 
integrated with the world economy. Second, though at a decreasing rate, 
Indonesia is still dependent on exports of many primary commodities, i.e. 
mining and agriculture. This means that its economy is still sensitive to any 
world price/demand instability for those commodities. Third, Indonesia has 
become increasingly dependent on imports of a number of food items such 
as rice, food grains, cereals, wheat, corn, meat, dairy, vegetables and fruits, 
and even oil. Any increases or instabilities of world prices or the world 
production failures of these commodities will have big effects on domestic 
consumption and food security in Indonesia. Fourth, more of the Indonesian 
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working population, including women, go abroad as migrant workers, and 
hence livelihoods in many villages in Indonesia have become increasingly 
dependent on remittances from abroad.  
 These vulnerabilities of the Indonesian economy were created during 
the authoritarian regime under the second president, Soeharto. Soeharto 
began his administration as to what he called the New Order regime in 1965. 
Under this new Soeharto administration, Indonesia experienced a very 
difficult and unhealthy economic structure that might have influenced the 
economic decline for future generations of Indonesia.  Soeharto was really 
famous for his corruption activities. Soeharto used tax payers' money on his 
electoral campaign, and he also used funds which were supposed to be used 
to finance public infrastructure, such as deforestation, to finance his 
Minister's Research and Technology‟s projects.
65
  
The New Order was a very strict dictatorship and presidential 
regime; during Soeharto's administration, political activists, university 
students, and opposite actors were kidnapped and killed. Starting from the 
crisis, students and activists gathered to deliver a movement for one 
Indonesia under democracy law. They came down to the street, demanding a 
transparent government, who is far from any corrupt behaviors.   People 
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were really angry towards Soeharto, his family, and his cronies who hold 
almost all big business entities in Indonesia.   
Suharto era, in which the military played the dominant role in 
Indonesian politics, was still in place. Most of the ordinary people in 
Indonesia were not aware that Suharto‟s regime created a lot of problems for 
Indonesians, including human suffering, corruption, collusion, nepotism, 
economic dependency on foreign debt, and economic collapse.
66
 Apart from 
that, during the Suharto period, there was no political freedom for the 
citizens. People began to ask the democratic system to rule Indonesia and 
for freedom of speech in public. However, there were some activists who 
disagreed with the plan to change Indonesia into a democractic country. One 
NGO activist states that: “Democracy is a project of capitalism to secure 
free-market competition. Democracy does not solve the unjust economic 
exploitation of the poor by the economically rich. We do not need 
democracy, we need socialism. In essence, democracy is only needed by a 
small number of elites and political scientists in Jakarta, but not by the 
majority of the poor people.
67 
              The discussion about democracy in Indonesia was getting hotter; 
more and more demonstrations occurred all over the country. This economy 
                                                          
66
 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding 
Problems, (Jakarta: 2010) p.2 
67
 See the conference of Transition Towards Democracy in Indonesia, Hotel 
Santika, (Jakarta 18 October 2012) 
 
 ５０ 
declined, and it not only led to conflict inside government agencies but it 
also led to huge and massive social unrest, riots, ethnic conflicts, separatists' 
movements, as well as crime and interpersonal violence.
68
 A demonstration 
that was headed by Indonesian student movements, ultimately occupied the 
parliament building in May 1998. More than a thousand students gathered 
after police shot several students from Trisakti University on May 12th 1998, 
which they called the Trisakti Tragedy of 1998, forcing Suharto to step 
down from his position as president of Indonesia after more than 30 years 
dominated by military support. Finally Soeharto stepped down on 
May 21
st
 1998, and Indonesia started a new democratic system.  This 
change toward a democratic regime, created various distributed groups, 
parliaments that represent different political parties, many emerging NGOs 
and other influential organizations. 
              After the regime of Soeharto collapsed, he transferred his 
presidency to BJ. Habibie.
69
 Habibie with his new presidential rule not only 
had to bring Indonesia into an accountable and transparent constitution, 
freedom from corruption, collusion and nepotism, but also in the same time 
had to deal with IMF programs with the Indonesian economic condition 
which was still declining and sending Indonesian people into a deeper 
poverty. Even though Habibie could produce a more political liberalization, 
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he failed to maintain his power. During his short legacy, domestic conflicts 
and separatism movements emerged; Indonesia in 1999 lost one province 
after Habibie gave a chance to Timor Leste people to choose to be a part of 
Indonesia or be independent. 
             Through the 1999 presidential election, which was quite fair, 
Megawati Soekarno Putri, a daughter of Soekarno, first became president of 
Indonesia through winning the election, but the national assembly mandated 
Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth president of Indonesia. Although 
Megawati won the election, she could not form the government; she was 
just holding the Vice-President position that caused much anger among her 
supporters. Demonstrations during that period colored the daily life of 
Indonesian people. Conflicts, social unrest, and separatist movements in 
several regions occurred especially in the East part of Indonesia, such as 
Maluku, Ambon and Papua, created social instability. 
              The crisis of leadership was brought to a point of no return by some 
government group scandal, leading to opposition in the parliament.
70
 In the 
middle of 2001, the parliament pushed Gus Dur to transfer his presidency to 
Megawati. With many complicated and unfinished problems from the 
previous administrations, Megawati administration had to deal with the 
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unstable political instability, separatism, terrorism, domestic conflicts, and 
the yet to be recovered economic crisis. Not only were these clashes among 
parties and parliament members, there many conflicts related to 
constitutional amendment.  
              Under the Megawati administration, the real meaning of democracy 
disappeared. Indonesia's democracy transition is marked by a situation in 
which democracy procedures take place but the substantial democracy is 
ignored. Several laws were amended with the new government system, 
many new regulations and laws were created, and some of them were 
related to problems of terrorism in many regions all over Indonesia. Several 
bombings in Bali Island pushed foreigners to leave Bali. Yet, several other 
bombings in Jakarta and other cities also endangered the democracy process 
in Indonesia. It led to worse relations in Indonesia and other states. 
Bombing, social unrest, and demonstrations created more difficulties and 
challenges for the new government to solve the economic crisis during those 
years. High inflation, low value of Indonesian currency, high rate of 
unemployment, and the prices of goods and services that did not decrease, 







IV. Government’s Capacity and Capability  
 
4.1       Korean Government’s Capacity and Capability on Economic 
and Political Reform 
South Korean government officially made a request on the helps 
from the International Monetary Fund on November 21, 1997 in order to 
rescue the economic decline, after almost all foreign reserves were depleted. 
After the request was submitted, the Executive Board of the IMF approved 
the three year Stand-by Arrangement on December 3, 1997, equipped with 
the memorandum of economic program. Through the Stand-by Arrangement, 
the member country of the IMF can get support from that international 
financial institution, under the direction of the Managing Director of IMF, 
who leads the IMF plan of economic recovery support through a Letter of 
Intent. 
The three year Stand-by Agreement that Korea signed in the end of 
1997 was the 17
th
 Stand-by Agreement since the year 1965. To overcome 
the financial crisis that began in the mid-1997, the Korean government 
intended to address the fundamental causes of its crisis and restore the 
market confidence and recover its economic growth with not only one Letter 
of Intent but six Letters of Intent. The first Letter of Intent was signed by 
both parties in the end of that year, contained of several commitments to 
implement such programs: 
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1. The Macroeconomic policy which included exchange rates, 
fiscal policy, foreign reserves, external debt management, and 
money supply. 
2. Restructuring of financial sector. 
3. Corporate restructuring. 
4. Trade liberalization. 
5. Liberalization of capital account. 
6. Restructuring of Labor Market. 
 
For the macroeconomic policy, IMF suggested the Korean 
government to increase their interest rates and tighten the aggregate demand. 
It was proposed as an effort to maintain tight monetary policy to restore and 
sustain calm in the market and contain the inflationary impact of the recent 
won depreciation.
71
 In the fourth Letter of Intent, on January 7, 1998, was 
written that high interest rate policy is crucial for stabilization of the foreign 
exchange market.
72
  However this high interest rate caused more and larger 
business bankruptcies during that period. High interest rates showed worse 
result for Korean businesses, 123 companies on the average failed each day- 
a 1000% increased from a year earlier.
73
 In the fact the leveraged 
conglomerates bankruptcy remained for several factors since the beginning 
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of the year 1997, including the depression of export prices and devalued of 
Korean currency Won. The bankruptcies spilled over into a sharp increase in 
nonperforming loans (defined according to international standards) to 32 




Therefore to cope with this exigent situation, since February 7, 1998, 
Korean government requested to have more flexible stance toward the high 
interest rates. The government of Korea saw this tight monetary policy 
would not increase the value of Korean won and avoid speculative activities, 
however would bring the economy of Korea to a worse economic brink. 
After the Korean government started to lower its interest rates from above 
30% to 15%, the stability of Korean currency Won could be reverted and the 
number of bankruptcy started to decrease. 
Table 4.1 
Korean Exchange Rate to USD In 1997-1998 




(brokerage trading ) 
Corporate Bonds 
July 1997 11.90 11.90 890.5 
August 12.91 12.16 895.9 
September 14.22 12.60 909.5 
October 13.06 12.60 921.9 
November 12.10 15.10 1025.6 
December 31.32 28.98 1,484.3 
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January 1998 27.21 18.50 1,706.8 
February 24.27 20.50 1,623.1 
March 22.05 18.28 1,505.3 
April 18.04 17.70 1,335.2 
May  16.71 18.82 1,410.8 
June  14.4 16.0 1,385.2 
Sources: The Ministry of Finance and Economy, Economic Indicators, 1998 




 The purpose to tighten monetary condition was to restore the market 
and limit inflation on 5 percent in the year 1998, government put high 
expectation through this tightness monetary policy the depreciation of Won 
could be controlled. Since 1998, the tightened monetary policy was reduced 
in order to produce a more flexible exchange rate policy. In the graph below, 
the value of won dropped to almost 2000 per USD in the end of 1997, thus 
the downward of won could be controlled to around 1100 KRW per USD in 
the middle of 2000. 
Graph 4.1 





Sources: Trading Economics 
 
 
The government of Korea also struggled to limit government and 
bank intervention on the market with the purpose to smooth the operation of 
the market. Its government‟s commitment to healing the business system in 
Korea began with giving the access for business actors to explore and 
develop their markets. Government would not intervene much, however still 
would control those companies and investors with the objective to produce a 
healthy business management and system, thus in the near future could 
demolish monopoly of big industrial conglomerates inside the country. 
Many large and small businesses enjoyed their operation and expansion 
during this time. Besides, the government also cut the expenditure budget. 
This policy was designed to maintain the fiscal to be always in balance. This 
budget they used it for restructuring the financial sector that became mass 
up and declined. 
Table 4.2  
The Letter of Intent on Monetary Policies 
 
Objectives Measures Taken Measures Planned 
A. Maintenance of A  
Sound Fiscal Basis 
  
-Maintain a strict fiscal policy 
in 1998 to remove the strains on 
monetary policies and finance 
the restructuring in the financial 
sector. 
-Increased revenues and 
implemented measures to 
cut expenditures in order to 
maintain a sound fiscal 
basis. 
-Announced a tax rate 
adjustment proposal on 
December 3, 1997. 
-Supplementary budget 
proposal submitted to the 
Special Session of the 
National Assembly in 
-Enforce measures to 






-Cut in tax expenditures: 
KRW 8.4 trillion. 
-Expansion of tax 
revenues: KRW 4 trillion. 
-Raise KRW 24 trillion to 
satisfy the Basle minimum 
capital requirements. For this 
purpose, the budget will reflect 
KRW 3.6 trillion of interest (0.8 
percent of GDP), incurred from 
the borrowing of public funds. 
-Announced the plan to 
issue KRW 24 trillion of 
bonds through the Deposit 
Insurance Fund and Non-
Performing Loan 
Management Fund, and the 
government‟s intent to 
guarantee the repayment 
of, and interest on the 
bonds from the budget on 
December 10, 1997. 
-The National Assembly 
passed the Proposal of 
Payment Guarantee 
Agreement on December 
29, 1997. 
-Issue bonds. 
-A 1.2 percent consolidated 
central government deficit is 
predicted because of a slow-
down in growth for 1998 and 
the rise of KRW/USD exchange 
rate. However, the IMF has 
approved a budget deficit of up 
to 1.75 percent due to the fall in 
growth and effects of the 
restructuring.  
-Expenditure on 
construction of a social 
safety net in expectation of 
a rise in unemployment is 
to increase up to KRW 7.9 
trillion (1.7 percent of 
GDP). 
 
Sources: The Letter of Intent between Korea and the International Monetary Fund 1997-
1998, see: Adjustment Reforms in Korea Since the Financial Crisis, Korea Institute For 
International Economic Policy 
 
All of these solutions showed a positive result in June 1998, after the 
foreign reserves increased up to five times from under 7 billion USD in the 
end of 1997 to 37.04 billion. In the mid of 2002, the foreign reserve of 





Graph 4.2  
Korea Foreign Exchange Reserve 
 
 
Sources: Trading Economics from the Bank of Korea Data 




 The Korean government was intended to address its financial sector 
with the objective to rebuild healthy financial institutions that would affect 
the financial system including the weak and troubled financial institutions, 
deal with its management based on international financial standard and be 
more transparent to its public. To execute this plan, the International 
Monetary Fund recommended Korea to make some restructuring on its 
banks. Korea was suggested to establish an independent central bank with 
the primary function of controlling inflation, since the inflation rate was 
really high during the current crisis.  
In order to cut the ties between governments and chaebols, 
government also demanded a creation of consolidated supervisory body 
with jurisdiction over all financial and corporate operations. From that time, 
all companies must report their financial status, firms report audited and the 
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entire business enterprises must follow the new regulations on transparency 
and clean business operation with government. Government started to 
enforce the financial institutions and banks that have problems to 
recapitalize, and eliminate the government loans. The objective of this 
program was to stress more on transparency in the transaction of each 
banking system. 
 Under the new presidential administration, Kim Dae Jung officially 
started from February 1998, the central banks was allowed to increase the 
money supply to lower interest rates, and fiscal targets were progressively 
relaxed to accommodate the cyclical downturn in revenues. The goal of 
financial reform itself was to strengthen the regulatory framework of Korean 
financial standard and promote private effort for bank recapitalization. 
Government regulated all troubled banks and corporations to conform the 
government target of healthy banks and corporations. All the commercial 
banks and other financial institutions were monitored by Financial 
Supervisory Committee (FSC) that was established in April 1998. The 
government also forced to revise the Bank of Korea Act to provide for 
central bank independence with price stability as its main mandate.
75
 
 These banking restructuring should be accomplished to get the 
function of financial markets to work properly as before the crisis and to 
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resolve the problem of credit crunch which occurred since the beginning of 
1997. This program was an attempt to enable the Korean banks to compete 
with large foreign banks and to create a new system in Korean banking. 
After the restructuring has been completed, there were three categories:
76
 
the large banks were created through merger among large banks, the 
medium-sized banks will manage the retail banking and the last category 
was for small banks in specific areas. 
 The shape of new banking system showed a more transparent 
management. It was an effort to convince the domestic and foreign investors 
to get their confidence back in Korean market and industry. FSC in the same 
year required disclosure to bank‟s internal management to be strengthened. 
They suggested an establishment of credit-screening capacity and 
introduced developing risk management and tightening internal control 
system for all banks. Since the government built the standard for the Korean 
unhealthy banks, in the end of 1998 only 14 merchant banks were still 
operating. However for those troubled banks, the government did not leave 
it only through closing them, thus they would implement the rehabilitation 
plan for a specified time. And to increase the bank management efficiency, 
banks such as KEB and Chohung Bank improved their productivity by 
reducing expenses through cutting the number of inefficient workers and 
improving their system of internal bank management.  
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Besides the FSC as an independent consolidated supervisory 
authority for banks, security houses and insurance companies, government 
also introduced the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and 
the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), to clean up the non-
performing loans and strengthen the capital base of banks. The funds spent 
by those corporations reached about 128 billion USD (at the exchange rate 
of 1200 Korean Won to one U.S. dollar) 29 percent of Korea‟s GDP in 2000, 
as of September 2001.
77
 In the meanwhile, government gave permission for 
foreign investor to play role on Korean financial sectors. 
 On the trade sector, Korean government agreed to liberalize its trade 
to meet international standards. To continue its policy, Korea had abolished 
restriction on 25 imports in December 1997 under the Import 
Diversification Act, and continued by June 1998 an additional abolishing for 
40 items under the same program. The government took several following 
actions such as eliminating the Import Certification Procedures and 
abolishing trade- related subsidies in the same time promoting transparency 
of Import Certificate Procedures to make it more harmonious with 
international trade and market practices, in the same time lowered the tariff 
on manufacture goods to around 6 percent. Through this plan, its 
government was planning to increase their export rate and for domestic 
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business, to expand and encourage its competitions which also could 
improve Korean products quality in national and international markets. 
Regarding the liberalization of capital account, the government has 
done some following measures: 
1. Raised the aggregate foreign ownership of some shares to 55% from 
the previous sharing was only 26% till the end of 1998. 
2. Increased the individual ownership by foreigner to 50%. 
3. Government successfully erased the restriction on foreign access to 
domestic money market instruments and the corporate bond market. 
4. Removed all remaining restrictions on corporate borrowings, 
including loans with one- to three-year maturities, by end-1998. 
Table 4.3 




The result of the macroeconomic restructuring programs could be 
seen through its economic indicators such as inflation rates, debt-GNP 
ration, current account deficits, government budget deficits, unemployment 
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rate, poverty rate and its export growth. The unemployment rate in Korea 
abruptly climbed after several leveraged business conglomerates went to 
experienced severe insolvent. A wide-scale of reduction on number of 
employees, its rate of unemployment in Korea up in short period of time, 
however after the economic recovery prescription from the IMF was 
completed, and unemployment rate in Korea showed an incredible number 
of reductions. As we see in the graph below, the unemployment rate in 
Korea in 1999 rose to over 7% and the number of unemployment rate in the 









 Its external debts were also decreased in the period of three years 
stand-by arrangement program. See the graph below. South Korea‟s external 
debts advanced to more than doubled in the year 1997 and 1998. 
Graph 4.4 
Korea External Debt 
 
 
Sources: Trading Economic from data of the Bank of Korea 
Unit: Million US Dollar 
 
The unhealthy relation between Korean industrial conglomerates and 
government officers was one of the biggest causes that triggered Korea‟s 
currency crisis in 1997-1998. The IMF pointed on the need for such 
restructuring related to this issue. By following the IMF prescription, the 
Korean government need to stress on the corporate restructuring programs, 
in which program should be based on market principles, where the 
government should have a non-intervention policy. This issue is an 
important policy task for the government of South Korea during that period, 
since it was not only standing as a politics issue but also correlated to the 
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financial restructuring program, they should take place simultaneously 
because causes and effects would run both ways. Corporate weaknesses 
would lead to financial weaknesses, while vulnerability of the financial 
sector would lead to a credit crunch, which in turn causes inaccessibility of 
funds to the companies.
78
  
 Hence, since January 1998 there were five main guidelines for 
Chaebols to follow with the objective to restore the health and courage the 
competitiveness among corporate sectors. Its strategy consisted of 
promoting competition and improving corporate governance, capital 
structure, and profitability.
79
 The five guidelines contained several 
important programs: 
1. Enhancement of the transparency of business management. 
2. Ending mutual debt guarantees between affiliate companies 
3. Improvement of financial structure,  
4. Reducing the core business areas of large conglomerates and 
encouraging their cooperative ties with SMEs 
5. Increasing the responsibilities of controlling shareholders and 
management. 
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In the Letter of Intent, there was new policy for Korean government 
not to intervene any bailout for industrial business conglomerates anymore, 
since 1998 creditor banks will be an independent decision maker. Through 
this policy, the IMF hopes the corporate and government restructuring 
program will improve the transparency management as an attempt to reduce 
mutual debt guarantees among them. By improving a corporate management 
that is based on transparency, it could lead to accountability among 
conglomerate businesses; then further it required the industrial companies to 
follow the international accountability standard. 
In the 6
th
 Letter of Intent that has been signed on May 2, 1998, IMF 
stressed on several principles of corporate restructuring policies, including 
first, all corporate restructuring should be voluntary and market oriented, 
second; public funds will not be used to bail out corporations. Government 
also required Chaebols to be monitored, they also must disclose all 




Regarding this corporate reforms, government took priority on 
reforming the industrial structure. The first step of these policies was The 
Ministry of Finance and Economy created a corporate restructuring scheme 
which they called “the Big Deals” under the Kim Dae Jung administration. 
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Through this scheme, government attempted to relieve one of the main 
contributing factors of Korean economy recession since Chaebols put on a 
heavy excessive investment for several years and built a huge amount of 
debt that triggered the crisis in the Korean economy. 
Kim Dae Jung administration has pushed the Chaebols into mergers 
and asset swap to try to raise its specialization and reap the benefit of 
consolidation and scale economies.
81
 Government in the same time also 
established a deal with the top five of Korean industrial leaders such as 
Hyundai, Samsung, LG, Daewoo and SK. These five biggest Chaebols were 
required to restructure its financial and operational in order to achieve the 
government target on debt/equity ratios. This policy ends to a positive result 
in the end of year 2000. The average debt/equity ratio decreased below the 
international norm of 200% from prevailing 400%.  
The crisis also restrained its government to focus on reversion of 
unhealthy corporate sectors with the purpose to build good corporate 
governance and the strategy to upgrade its competitiveness. Transparency 
must be the standard for Korean companies in creating their businesses. The 
ownership must be shared widely and the system should be accountable to 
shareholder. Through this plan, its government tried to promote such 
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programs, (1) improvement of government structure on the institutional 
investors‟ voting right for big companies; (2) strengthen the rights of 
minority shareholders; (3) increasing the corporate sectors based on the 
standards of transparency, all must be known by public, and all firms must 
report their financial statements; (4) one of most important initiatives is by 
liberalizing the domestic mergers through elimination of mandatory tender 
offer the requirements. 
These programs up to today, showed a good image of Korean 
companies and governments banned any activities to fund political 
campaign and programs through the budget of Korean companies. Therefore, 
right now the system of eradiating corruption in institutions, government 
and companies showed with successful results. Korean governments could 
control the transparency of such companies, and in the same time, industrial 
businesses have their access to compete in international and domestic 
market with good image. The improvement in the sector of corporate 
governance also provided contribution on its economic recovery. Its 







4.2 Indonesian Government’s Capacity and Capability on Economic 
and Political Reform  
In October 1997, before the Korean government signed their 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund, Indonesian government 
has requested funding aid for their own crisis. The IMF suggested several 
restructuring programs on the macroeconomic sector and demanded some 
political restructuring policies. The first recovery agreement between 
Indonesia and IMF was signed in the last day of October 1997. These 
programs were focused on four sectors: 
1. Restructuring financial sector 
2. Fiscal policy 
3. Monetary policy 
4. Structural adjustment  
 
In order to provide these programs, the IMF allocated a Stand-by 
credit of around 11.3 billion USD for the three to five year period of the 
program. In addition to the IMF, the government of Indonesia also requested 
aid from several other international financial institutions such as World 
Bank, Asia Development Bank, as well as from neighboring countries. The 
total of Indonesia foreign debt that time was 37 billion USD.
82
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The second negotiation between Indonesia and IMF was held as an 
attempt to revise the agreement since the Indonesian government faced 
many difficulties while putting the policies ordered by the IMF into effect. 
The new Letter of Intent was signed in the middle of January 1998 with the 
purpose to build the confidence of investors and Indonesian citizens in 
Indonesia‟s economic condition in order to restore the value of Indonesian 
Rupiah. In this Letter of Intent, the government stressed the macroeconomic 
policy which focused on fiscal policy and monetary and currency recovery 
programs. The government was also ordered to restructure its financial 
sector including a restricted banking program featuring new control and 
management systems.  
An economic downturn which threatened to further deteriorate 
Indonesia‟s fiscal condition made the IMF to order Indonesia to cut its 
expenditures and increase revenues immediately.  A new policy was created 
based on the suggestion of IMF which erased fuel and electricity subsidies, 
a program which the government had already found to be a large and crucial 
burden. The Indonesian government started to apply this program from May 
4, 1998. Despite the government‟s predictions, the sudden implementation 
of this policy induced many serious problems not only for poor people but 
also for domestic businesses, leading to unstable social conditions and 




Many activists criticized this initiative, arguing that the government 
should have considered the possible conflicts and social turmoil which 
could have, and ultimately did, appear before actually implementing any 
programs. As a consequence, a large number of demonstrations and riots 
arose in big cities and spread to small ones. Nonetheless, in the following 
months the government once again diminished the subsidy on foods and 
basic goods. During those difficult years, the government of Indonesia could 
not identify the problems based on citizen interests. Its government kept 
continuing to implement every suggestion of the IMF without a deep 
consideration on its possibility of the unexpected impacts to Indonesian 
people.  
The Bank of Indonesia mentioned that the government needed to 
restore the currency value to a normal level before they could measure what 
level of subsidy they needed to provide.
83
 On one side, the IMF approved 
the government to provide some funding to social safety programs. 
However, this deflation of subsidies had the potential to cause side effects to 
both social and economic stability. Those policies could destroy macro-
economic policy, particularly regarding currency and inflation stability.
84
 
Additionally, during this period companies laid off more than 50% of their 
employees, leading to a sharp rise in the unemployment rate. 
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Graph 4 .5 
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Sources: Bank of Indonesia 
 
 The government was also ordered to tighten its monetary system in 
order to protect Indonesia from any speculative attack by raising the interest 
rate to over 80% from 20%, the highest increase in an interest rate level in 
the history of the Indonesian economy. Not long after the government 
announced the rising interest rate, a massive wave of bankruptcies swept 
through the country. Not only did the sudden increase in production costs 
lead to bankruptcy in small businesses but also many medium-sized 
companies went insolvent due to the extremely tight monetary policy. This 
time, the government of Indonesia should produce an appropriate policy to 
restore its market and return back the investors‟ confidence, however this 
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policy did not show a positive result, and unexpectedly it destroyed national 
businesses, mainly small and medium businesses. 
After the Bank of Indonesia increased its interest rate to this high 
level, the government continued squeezing the liquidity. As a consequence, 
several banks, ranging in size from small-middle to large, experienced 
liquidity problems. These banks experienced clearing payment failures since 
they violated the reserve requirement regulation. Besides that, Jakarta Stock 
Indices (IHSG BEJ) fell sharply from 740.8 on July 8, 1997 to 493 on 
August 29, 1997, approximately a 37 percent drop due to the increasing of 
the deposit interest rate.
85  
The stock exchange had slowed down as investors preferred 
depositing their money in banks over investing in stocks. This deposit 
interest rate automatically produced a higher lending interest rate of over 40 
percent followed by credit card interest and loan interest for housing. As 
outcome, this created a risk for banks since debtors had liquidity problems 
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Indonesia Interest Rate 
 
 
Sources: Bank of Indonesia 
The IMF also demanded that the government must not intervene in 
the internal banking system. Before this the banking system was largely 
controlled by the Indonesian government which in turn relied on the budget 
from the banks. This tight relationship between the government and the 
banks led to wide spread corruption in the government-banking system.  
The IMF suggested closing several troubled banks with the goal of 
healing the Indonesian banking system. Without knowing the possible result 
of such an initiative, the government closed many commercial banks over a 
short period of time. As such, the Bank of Indonesia closed 16 banks in 
November 1997.  
This decision was made by the prescription of International 
Monetary Fund. However other consequences challenged the government to 
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create a more appropriate response. Sudden bank liquidation had ruined the 
public trust in national banks. This in turn caused citizens to lose their 
confidence in the Bank of Indonesia and in local banks, deepening the 
economic crisis. A massive withdrawal of equity from both national banks 
and especially local commercial banks and into foreign banks occurred from 
the beginning of December 1997, causing an acute liquidity crisis in 
national banking. This policy had also made the national banking system 
collapse and the rupiah value drop against US dollar. 
The Indonesian currency, the Rupiah, was devalued by 90%. From 
January 23-26 1998, the value of the rupiah dropped to over 14,000 per 
USD and the exchange rate, which had been around 2300 rupiah to 1 USD, 
dropped to reach 15,000 per USD in June 1998. This value has been 
difficult task for the Indonesian government to restore and even after 14 
years the exchange rate is still on 11.542 IDR to 1 USD as of April 29, 
2014.
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Indonesian Exchange Rate to USD in 1997-2001 
 
 
Sources: Bank of Indonesia 
The Letter of Intent that was signed in the early of 1998 contains 50 
items. However, only after five months the Indonesian government asked 
for new negotiations due to its challenges and obstacles in implementing the 
programs. The new memorandum covered larger sectors and programs than 
the two previous agreements. In this new agreement, they added programs 
to address the problem of Indonesian private companies‟ foreign debt. The 
total foreign debt of Indonesia in 1997 reached 135 billion USD, including 
both government and private sector debt. This huge amount of debt was one 
of the factors that triggered the turmoil in the exchange rate and caused the 
economic decline of that time. Without enough information and monitoring 
systems for foreign debts, private sectors‟ debts could increase market 
demand for the US dollar, thus leading to a further currency crisis. 
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Hence, the IMF believed with these new ideas, Indonesia could 
stabilize its currency. The strategies of the new supplementary 
memorandum included the following programs: 
1. Stabilizing the value of Indonesian currency Rupiah 
2. Strengthening and fastening the banking system restructure 
3. Strengthening the implementation of structural reform for building 
an efficient economy of the nation 
4. Creating framework to solve foreign debt by private companies 
5. Increasing the number of export to support the domestic industries 
 
Soon after these reforms were announced, the International 
Monetary Fund recommended the Indonesian government liberalize all 
economic sectors and establish confidence of foreign investment in order to 
obtain more foreign capital flow. The liberalization reforms included giving 
opportunities to foreigners and foreign companies to have 100% ownership 
in national businesses, such as banks and stocks. However, after the launch 
of the liberalization of national businesses to foreigners, the domestic 
industries lost their percentage in having and enlarging the national 
industries. Local business men were left without adequate business. 
The government requested national economists to rethink the 
appropriate programs to recover from this crumbled crisis. The only strategy 
to resolve all impacts of 1997-1998 financial crises was to stabilize the 
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Indonesian currency value, restructure banking, and reschedule payments of 
foreign debt.
87
 World Bank also gave several recommendations to build and 
increase confidence in the Rupiah through several main policies, such as 
private company debt restructuring programs, banking reform, improving 
“the governance” and protection of fiscal and monetary stability during the 
transition period.
88
 All of those economic reforms that IMF already 
suggested were seen as vague initiatives that they applied to all countries 
without analyzing the real economic and political conditions in the receiver 
countries. Consequently, these programs were observed by foreign and 
domestic economists as not appropriate for Indonesia.  
In the political sector, its government dealt with some reforms with 
the objective to create healthy and clean governance. Therefore, the political 
reform in Indonesia had undergone several stages. The regime under 
Soeharto‟s leadership, which had a strong relationship with the armed forces 
for almost four decades, remained not only an authoritarian  but also 
centralized political system with the only a single truly influential party; the 
Golongan Karya Party. The crisis in 1997-98 and the emergence of new 
civilian political elites drove the number of student movements in the name 
of democracy and for the future of Indonesia which spread across almost all 
territories in Indonesia. Thousands of students gathered and called for the 
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fall of Soeharto, fueled by almost a year of economic crisis and the 
government remaining unable to deal with various emerging impacts.  
The Soeharto regime ultimately ended through a large escalation of 
protest and a massive brutal student movement, leading to the emerging of 
multiple civilian democratic parties. Soeharto was abdicated his crown on 
May 20, 1998 after a huge number of demonstrators successfully took over 
the national legislature building. There are several arguments from 
international politicians regarding the resignation of Soeharto. Soeharto‟s 
fall was the result of “a dramatic change in the structures of political 
authority that began in the mid-1980s” with economic reform and led to 
weakening of loyalty of his allies.
89
 Soeharto‟s fall can also be at least partly 
attributed to his old age (seventy-seven), which impaired his ability to 
identify and rationally solve the problems associated with the economic 
crisis.
90
 The fall of the New Order administration in terms of the fatal flaws 
and sources of tension within the Soeharto regime that accelerated its 
disintegration in the context of economic crisis.
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The fall of Soeharto did not mean the reformation of new democratic 
system was closed completely. The new government still faced many 
challenges. The violent crackdowns of the dictatorship regime led to turmoil 
in the capital city which precipitated civil unrest all over the country. One of 
the biggest riots in the history of Indonesia took place in Jakarta on May 15, 
1998. Within a period of 33 hours, the riot claimed the lives of many 
Indonesian people of Chinese descent. Not a small number of homes and 
vehicles were burned and many Indonesian-Chinese women were abused 




During this period the political situation in Indonesia was 
uncontrolled and promiscuous. The fall of the authoritarian regime allowed 
new political parties to contribute in the national political arena. 48 political 
parties participated in the 1999 presidential elections, the largest number of 
political parties in a single election in Indonesia‟s history.
93
 Most of the new 
political parties that emerged during the financial crisis were dominated by 
new political actors but the big five parties that were still chaired by senior 
political elites.  
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Before Soeharto vacated his presidential position, Habibie stood as 
Vice President of Indonesia, thus directly after Soeharto was forced to leave 
the president office, the new democratic government was continued by new 
President Habibie whose background as a scientist. Habibie, who lacked 
experience in the political arena, carried on ruling Indonesia as the 
economic situation deteriorated. This new government had a very big task in 
front of it: to reform its wrecked regime, the so called New-Order.  
During the “reform period” under Habibie‟s administration, 
Indonesia launched many initiatives to reform the armed forces which, 
under Soeharto‟s reign, had already ruled Indonesia for over 30 years. In 
November 1998 four students at Trisaksi University were killed during a 
demonstration. Called “the Trisaksi Tragedy”, this event triggered massive 
roits which lasted for three days. In the wake this, thousands of Indonesian 
activists and a huge number of students insisted the government change its 
military bodies based on a political system that adjusted to democratization. 
This student movement forced the government to remove all New Order 
Regime-related elites and resisted the abolition of dual function of the 
Indonesian armed forces.
94
 Indonesia‟s politics soon descended into one of 
the most difficult political crisis the country had faced since 1965.
95
 Human 
right groups and most of Indonesian democratic activists pressured the 
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government to reform its military forces, as well as the nation judicial 
system, electoral mechanism, government representatives‟ bodies, and the 
withdrawal of all Soeharto related political comrades from the political 
system they used to hold before the crisis. The people insisted that the new 
system should be based on civilian decision which should be from citizen to 
citizen. 
 The political reform in Indonesia was focused on military reform 
and its political system. During the Soeharto administration,  the armed 
forces such as the TNI (the Indonesian National Military) occupied much 
power over political activities and had a huge influence on the decision 
making process. The TNI was given a large role in Indonesia‟s institutional 
interest by the central government on both the national and local level. 
Soeharto and his political cronies had used a large amount of the national 
budget to fund their military programs, policies, and activities. The TNI 
began to preserve its dual function as the guardian of the nation and the 
protector of Soeharto‟s regime through their participation in political issues. 
More importantly, they believed that the TNI had gone too far in its 
implementation of dual function doctrine and needed to restore its previous 
image as the people‟s armed forces.
96
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Along with this insistence on military reform, the new Indonesian 
government experienced pressure to democratize its military bodies by 
working to de-politicize the TNI‟s power in the political system. The TNI 
was also found to be massively corrupt and much of its income came from 
illegal and semi-legal activities including prostitution, drug-dealing, 
environmentally destructive logging, and trafficking in people.
97
 Besides the 
internal reform of armed forces, the government also pledged reform 
regarding human rights in the armed forces. One of the biggest causes that 
triggered the anger of the Indonesian people during the Soeharto regime was 
the abuse of military power. The people who disagreed with any activities of 
Soeharto and his governors were arrested, with some being kidnapped and 
never heard from again. Since the fall of Soeharto, the new President 
Habibie pushed all armed forces to resolve this problem; to follow Western 
democratic way. Nevertheless, the reform of the armed forces was still far 
from what the citizen had hoped due to President Habibie‟s personal 
interests. 
Another launching of political reform under President Habibie‟s 
supervision was the general election with participation of multiparty. This 
concession seemed to give citizens more freedom with regard to speech, 
allowing them to have a saying in electing their next leader. Habibie chaired 
Indonesia for a very short period from May 1998 to October 1999 and failed 
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to continue his presidential role after an unsuccessful reelection campaign. 
During his rule, many important decisions were made but, equally 
significantly, opportunities were missed.
98
 His initiatives along with his 
reformation agenda relied on interdependence between his governance and 
the military body. The government relied on the armed forces‟ support on 
the implementation of government programs including the election 
campaigns. As such, complete reform inside the military couldn‟t be 
achieved. On one hand, President Habibie need military forces to control the 
unrest and conflicts on both the national and local level, but on another hand, 
the military elites depended on the president‟s support on budget funding 
permits to maintain its special privilege. 
This interdependency provided crucial privilege for senior military 
actors, allowing them to keep having influence on national politics and 
government institutions. They were permitted to adjust its own reform 
agenda, which was supposed to be civilian controlled. The deal brought 
several tasks for military forces to support President Habibie‟s campaign for 
1999 general election. In November 1998, the TNI was requested to 
disperse thousands of civilian demonstrators to back Habibie‟s plan to 
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In order to further his personal interests, President Habibie appointed 
General Wiranto as the leader of the national armed forces, instructing him 
to create his own objectives for the military reform which preserved military 
power. The framework of this new military reform consisted four of points: 
(1) the military was content not to be in the forefront of all national affairs; 
(2) the previous approach of occupying political positions was changed into 
influencing politics from a distance; (3) this influence was to be exerted 
indirectly rather than directly; and (4) the armed forces acknowledge the 
necessity of role-sharing with other national forces.
100
 The concepts initiated 
by General Wiranto were seen as not going far enough, reaping much 
criticism from the citizens. For several decades the TNI performed a special 
dual function: to function as a national defense institution while at the same 
time having influence on and controlling the national political system. This 
new concept, the so-called “New Paradigm”, was in content and wording 
identical with reform ideas formulated by progressive officers in 1996 and 
1997.
101
 The crucial and mistaken function that the government must 
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remove from the military institution was its authority inside national 
political process. 
The reformation program continued through the concept of 
separation of military officers from national politics. One of the crucial 
challenges that Indonesia faced in the course of authoritarian polity was the 
intervention of military elites on the decision of government on every 
program implementation. The tempestuous protests broke out mostly in the 
capital city, creating a more unstable social and political condition in 1998-
1999. Not only did riots and demonstrations take place but conflicts among 
ethnic groups lead to a more complicated and non-conducive social crisis. 
More than 50 riots occurred from 1998 to 1999 in all territories in 
Indonesia.
102
 Separatist groups endangered the unity of Indonesia, starting 
from the independence of East Timor during Habibie‟s administration 
period, followed by independence requests in Aceh, Ambon, Poso and 
Papua Province. The TNI once again dealt with the separatism in East 
Timor using violence and when East Timor voted for independence, the 
armed forces rampaged through the region, killing more than 1300 
people.
103
 The devastation of East Timor was a consistent extension of the 
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As a consequence, the TNI was forced to overcome the problem of 
human rights and its image. Due to activist pressure, government had no 
choice but to implement a new policy where military officers could no 
longer be active in bureaucracy. Even though the TNI still had the power to 
create their own reform targets without civilian oversight, they were forced 
to reduce their representative number in the national parliament and local 
legislature. TNI reduced its delegations from 75 to only 38 delegates in the 
national assembly. In local legislature, military forces also gradually 
reduced the percentage military delegates. However, even up to the 1999 
election, the involvement of the military in national politics remained a 
crucial influence. The TNI‟s continued representation in parliament, albeit 
reduced, endowed “the military with „reserve powers‟ that might be invoked 
to frustrate a democratic mandate.”
105
 
 Military reform was still an ongoing issue during Abdurrahman 
Wahid administration which began in 1999. He mandated the removal of 
several important generals from the armed forces, including Wiranto. He 
also asserted that Indonesia must deal seriously with the dual function 
                                                          
104
 Geoffrey Robinson, “Indonesia: On a New Course?” In Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 
Coercion and Governance. The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) pp 226–58 
105
 Richard Gunther, “Opening a Dialogue on Institutional Choice in Indonesia: 
Presidential, Parliamentary and Semipresidential Systems.” In Liddle, R. William, 
ed. Crafting Indonesian Democracy, (Bandung: Mizan, 2001) pp149-178.  
 
 ８９ 
system in which the TNI operated, separating them from the legislature on 
both the national and local level. He lost the support and cooperation of 
military bodies after clashing with senior military elites, seriously crippling 
his agenda to cut the territorial command structure in military groups. The 
new reforms proposed by President Wahid were not appropriate for the 
current situation; at the same time he lost the support of military forces he 
also had difficulties winning the sympathies of the citizens. The armed 
forces were only in a position to oppose presidential authority when political 
circumstances allowed them to do so.
106
 His presidency collapsed under 
massive conflicts within the elites and further unrest around the country. 
The impacts of the financial crisis still continued until the end of Wahid‟s 
reign. Governance was still unable to deal with the high prices of goods, the 
unemployment and poverty rates just kept increasing. This coincided with a 
rise in criminality starting from, 1998until the demonstration that destroyed 
the domestic businesses and economies. 
The agenda to create good governance was continued by Megawati 
from 2001 through 2004. Military reform was not the only problem facing 
the government but fixing the corrupt government and its political actors 
became a complicated and high priority issue for the Megawati 
administration. This culture of corruption was not limited to the political 
elite in high positions of authority but permitted all government institutions 
                                                          




and bodies, although this was not a new issue for Indonesia. Government 
officers often spent national budget on personal interests or the national 
budget simply went into their own pockets. Furthermore, leaders were used 
to sharing these benefits with their employees. Government officers would 
often ask local businesses for some nominal donation in order to facilitate 
the issuing of enterprises permits. Political actors and government officers 
had virtually unrestricted access to the national and domestic budgets for 
such programs as reduction of poverty, national health care, education for 
poor kids, religion activities, and other public services. 
Though the International Monetary Fund and other international 
institutions also couldn‟t make any large contributions to Indonesia‟s 
political reform, the IMF did require the Indonesian government establish a 
commission to combat corruption. The Corruption Eradication Commission 
was established in 2003. This commission was created in order to develop 
good governance based on transparency and accountability of political 
institutions. Indonesian political institutions and its governing bodies should 
produce accountability in the terms of an effective, transparent, and publicly 
accountable system for expenditure control and cash management as well as 
an external audit system.
107
 Many senior politicians were jailed for 
embezzlement of national budgets but the level of government corruption 
was still high. In 2002, Indonesia was ranked 118
th
 in the World Corruption 
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Rankings. Until 2010, Indonesia was experiencing issues with national 
corruption that led to a rank of 110 in the World Corruption Ranking with a 
relatively low score of 2.8. 
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Note: Score is based on a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to 
have low levels of corruption). 
 
 
 Besides all these problems, Indonesia also had to deal with collusive 
networks and patronage structures which remained in place along with their 
New Order-era politicians, bureaucrats, military personnel, lawyers, and 
policemen, all of whom were deeply entrenched in Indonesia‟s state 
apparatus and economy. Indonesia continued to launch another reform 
initiative focusing on bureaucratic reform by establishing rules and 
constraints aimed at controlling politicians‟ and civil servants‟ authority and 
behavior. This agenda tried to change the culture of Indonesia bureaucracy 
to be based on good governance, transparency, and civilian related purpose. 
Concretely, not just the degree of separation between political and 
bureaucratic accountability but also the extent of political 
institutionalization at the time of independence are said to determine 
whether a country is likely to adopt reform initiatives of the promotional 
kind.  
The stagnation of political reform to adjust democratization 
continued after the rising of terrorism.  Megawati not only had to deal with a 
significantly strengthened military but also was confronted with several 
domestic and international trends that were hardly of her making.
108
 
Multiple bombings in several cities, including in front of the Australian 
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Embassy, created an unstable social, political, and economic situation in 
Indonesia. It devastated the confidence of foreigners to invest in Indonesia. 
After the Bali bombing, the economic condition fell into crisis. Bali, as one 
of Indonesia‟s largest tourism destination, was one of the economic scopes 
that were not influenced by the 1998-1999 crises.  
Thus, after suicide bombings in several areas, the government had an 
even more complicated economic decline. Megawati seemed not able to 
improve the Indonesian economy significantly and consequently failed to 
win voters during the 2004 presidential election. The new President, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono is currently serving their second term in office. 
Yudhoyono was a senior in the military. In the era of Yudhoyono‟s 
administration, the economic growth showed a better nominal. In addition to 
continuing the anti-corruption programs on government level, Yudhoyono 
also focused on constitutional and electoral reforms aimed at introducing 
constitutional checks and balances. His government seemed to be better 
equipped to deal with Indonesia‟s political situation and showed 









V. DISCUSSION AND EXPLANATION  
OF THE DIFFERENCE 
 
5.1 Comparison on the Reform Progress 
The Asian Financial Crisis took place in Thailand in the middle of 
1997, spreading to neighboring countries and reached South Korea and 
Indonesia through a sudden drop of their currency values. The crisis 
emerged against the South Korea‟s and Indonesia‟s weak financial systems, 
large external deficits, immediately extinguished the confidence of investors, 
leading to a massive capital outflow, and creating the biggest national 
bankruptcies in both states.  
The two countries requested economic funds from international 
financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund. South 
Korea and Indonesia signed the Three Years Stand-by Arrangement and 
agreed to follow the economic recovery suggestions from the IMF. The IMF 
approved to help not only South Korea and Indonesia, but also to Thailand, 
the three countries most affected by the crisis through arrangement policies 
of economic reform that its objectives were to restore the confidence of 







The Commitment of IMF in Response to 1997 Crisis 
 
Sources: see IMF website 
Table 5.2 
GDP Growth of South Korea and Indonesia before Crisis 
 
 
Sources: Goldman Sachs, "International Economics Analyst", February/March 1998 p xii; 
IMF, "World Economic Outlook", May 1998 tables 5 & A2; BIS, "68th Annual Report", 
1998 table III.2; IMF, "World Economic Outlook: Interim Assessment", December 1997 
table A1; ROC Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
 
Before crisis hit Asia in 1997, South Korea and Indonesia 
experienced incredible economic growth and export rate. South Korea 
appeared as one of the industrial economic states particularly on automobile, 
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steel, telecommunication equipment and etc. Nevertheless, this miracle 
economic growth was not accompanied with strong banking system and 
adequate economic foundation, were really fragile to any economic shocks. 
The Letter of Intent in those two agreements among South Korean 
government and the IMF and Indonesian government with the IMF focused 
on comprehensive policy packages with the objectives to restore market 
confidence, bring back foreign investor inside the countries, limit the 
downturn of economic growth, reduce current account deficit that has 
already rose since massive capital outflow during the crisis, restructure and 
recapitalize insolvent financial institutions to be free from any intervention 
of political elites and market-oriented, improve its corporate governance to 
adjust transparency and accountability, and liberalize its economies and 
trade. 
In the middle of 1998, a dictatorship reign under Soeharto 
administration collapsed after more than 30 years ruled Indonesia, leading to 
a new government system behind democratic values. Compared to South 
Korea, the new government of Indonesia was not capable to choose a right 
program and recovery strategy that time; lack cohesion on political program 
and platform, confusion division of responsibilities and functions among 
different level of government. These conditions were influenced by the 
impacts of political transition during democratization. The inexperienced 
new cabinet suddenly should deal with the economic downturn and in the 
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same time many of demonstration and big riots took place in almost all 
territory of Indonesia. It caused unemployment rate increased and poverty 
line raised to over 30 percent.   
Meanwhile, the power shift, from the Kim Young-sam to Kim Dae-
jung in Korea brought the power to implement the IMF policies to the Kim 
Dae-jung government. The government of Korea performed with a high 
capacity to apply and deal with the IMF suggestions, especially in the 
banking restructuration.  In fact, no other political leader was better 
positioned than Kim to truly change the Korean system and recover from 
the crisis since he was able to involve cooperation among governments, 
businessmen and citizens. Moral hazard reduced foreign trade and 
investment raised, and unemployment rate decreased from 8.6% in February 
1999 to 3.4% in July 2000. 
 
5.1.1 Comparison on Monetary Reform Progress 
The reform started at the end of 1997 by implementing high interest 
rate policy. A sudden rise of high interest rate brought a massive bankruptcy 
in both countries. In South Korea, this policy triggered at least 11 national 
industrial businesses to become insolvent and another 50 leveraged business 
conglomerates were at risk of bankruptcy. Started with the bankruptcy of 
Hanbo Steel, one of the biggest steel producers in South Korea during those 
years, not a long period after, followed by the collapsed of other industrial 
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businesses, such as Sammi group and Jinro. Kia Motors, as one of the 
biggest the automobile manufactures also experienced the bankruptcy. 
Business bankruptcy cost 20% of country‟s half trillion dollar, increasing a 
huge number of unemployment rate in 1997-1998.  In Indonesia, the tight 
monetary policy through high interest rate over 80% also induced national 
bankruptcy not only to big national businesses but also domestic small-
medium size enterprises. Companies at a national and local level began to 
cut the number of their employees, leading to a massive and acute 
unemployment rate even until several years. 
The Korean government took a fast decision on creating a more 
flexible exchange rate and interest rate policies soon after the bankruptcy 
increased. In another side, the government of Indonesia kept increasing its 
rate to over 80%, causing an escalation of the poverty rate in that state. The 
Indonesian government tried to change the amendment of the content of 
letter of intent, however the ineffective and inefficient bureaucracy made the 
decision took longer time to be achieved. Especially after political 
instability started to emerge, the government under the dictatorship of 
Soeharto had their focus not on the economic recovery but on how the 
regime could be maintained. The government of Indonesia was not able to 
make fast decisions on the impact of interest rate policy; its government 
could not run its function as the institution that must be responsible to 
produce an appropriate response based on its capacity in the good 
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governance framework. Even though a high poverty rate in Indonesia was 
not a new problem, yet this challenge still remained a big homework for its 
government even after one decade passed. In 1998, the poverty rate in 
Indonesia reached almost 25% of its population, and after three years of the 
IMF recovery package, Indonesia still had 20% of its population in poverty.  
 
Graph 5.1 




With tightened monetary policy which was more strict for Indonesia 
compared to the monetary policy that the IMF suggested to South Korea, 
Indonesian economy experienced a severe contraction on both aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply. The IMF requested South Korea to increase 
almost 30% of interest rate, while in Indonesia the director of IMF forced 
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Indonesia to rise almost more than fourth times higher, which was from 
20% to be 80%. This policy was seen as a wrong decision after the impacts 
destroyed the national business and caused a worse economic crisis. 
 Instability on political condition during democratization transition 
brought a huge influence to its economy. Domestic demand fell to negative 
17.2%, followed with a depression of public consumption that signified a 
drop of market confidence in 1998. Indonesia also suffered with rising of 
private capital outflow of more than 20.7 billion dollar. The progress of its 
monetary policy did not show a positive result for Indonesian economy, 
pushing its government to amend the recovery prescription from the 
International Monetary Fund for several times. Another problem with the 
IMF assistance was the delayed of the release of its fund amount.  
The IMF for several times holds the funds for some reasons, creating 
its program implementation was hampered. Another outcome of monetary 
policy application was the unemployment rate in Indonesia that kept 
increasing even after several years of crisis, in Korean case, the 
unemployment rate decreased sharply, particularly in the year of 2003. See 









Unemployment Rate in Korea and Indonesia 
 
Sources: the Bank of Korea and Bank of Indonesia 
 
 If we look at the exchange rate in Indonesia and Korea in the 
previous chapters, the exchange rate of the Korean Won decreased to only 
1050 per USD in the year 2000 from the worst devalue of won in 1997, 
which was almost reached 2000 per USD. But for the Indonesian currency 
Rupiah, with the highest on almost 17.000 per USD in 1998, and the value 
increased to 12.000 per USD in the year 2000, which means the currency 
restore was only around 30%, and till today the value of Rupiah to 1 USD is 
still above 11.000. The devaluing of the Rupiah that time was clear evidence 
of failure fiscal policy remained with very high prices for basic goods. 
Brutally demonstration and the pillage during riots in 1998 caused supply of 




5.1.2 Comparison on Banking Restructuring Reform 
The progress of banking restructuring programs in South Korea 
showed a positive result after the Korean government and the IMF agreed 
on the 8 percent Bank of International Settlement (BIS) capital adequacy 
ratio as standard of insolvency. A bad banking system and its tight 
relationship with business conglomerates enforced government to cut the 
ties among them. All banks should be based on international accounting 
standard, not only in order to produce healthy banks but also to restore the 
confidence and trust of citizens in national banks. The difference with the 
actions of the Indonesian government during the crisis, instead of 
liquidating the troubled banks, Korean government decided to privatize 
them following their re-capitalization with government funds, the first two 
banks that addressed this policy were the Seoul Bank and the Korea First 
Bank. Both banks received 1.5 trillion KRW for capital investment from 
government and could obtain international public auction and received its 
confidence abroad. The other banks that had problems also were given a 
period of time to rehabilitate its system and were granted some amount of 
national funds to restore troubles and restart its banking function. 
By observing the Indonesian banking system before the crisis, we 
would know how badly the internal system inside the banks; those banks 
had problems since the management was very poor. Not different with 
Korean banks that time; in Indonesia the banks also had tight relations with 
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their government. The government used to intervene and fund their personal 
businesses by using the foreign debts. Therefore since the IMF‟s 
prescription to close 16 troubled banks in a sudden time, the effect was not 
like in Korea. This immediate banks liquidity crisis had caused a massive 
withdrawal of money and transferring to foreign banks due the vanishing of 
trust to national banks, leading to a more complicated economic decline by 
the devalue of the Indonesian Rupiah. The Indonesian government once 
more time was seen as an unable and inexperienced institution that could 
not produce a right policy to overcome the crisis. Looking at this banking 
program, the government of Indonesia also could not predict the possibility 
that could emerge if they closed several banks in the same time.  
The government of Indonesia also set the standard of recapitalization 
for national and commercial banks. Banks with over 4% capital adequacy 
ratio was able to operate, the banks with below 4% to -25%, were supposed 
to be recapitalized and the banks below -25% must be closed. Closing more 
than 16 banks, merged all state-owned banks to be only four was an obvious 
evidence of too big to fail policy
109
. This policy indirectly increased the 
state-owned banks to 72%, eliminating the number of private banks from 
160 to only 81, extinguished citizens‟ trust to national banks. People started 
to withdraw their money in national and local banks and thus moved it to 
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foreign banks. The confidence of national banks dropped, leading to 
reduction of investor‟s confidence.  
In Korea, the commercial banks tried to compete with foreign banks 
by improving their internal management system. Especially after Korean 
government announced to suspend nine merchant banks on December 1997 
and continued by suspension of 5 other banks, government requested those 
banks to have management rehabilitation with the deadline one month. The 
Korean government at the same time provided support by giving capital 
amount for them. This policy would not decrease the confidence of banks in 
the national level; citizen also still had its trust to use their national banks 
instead of using and moving their capital to foreign banks. Government 
promised to give accountable and best solution for the bank-restructuring 
program, both for the banks and for the citizens. This condition was totally 
different to the banking restructuring policy that only led to the brink crisis. 
This thesis shows how the decision was made, how the Korean 
government responded to the IMF suggestions and how the Indonesian 
government for several times was unable to choose an effective policy that 
would restore public confidence. Here, several programs that the its 
government made, did not produce a better economic condition, on the 
contrary established brink of public confidence to its government‟s bodies 




5.2 Comparison of the Economic Recovery 
The recovery on the economic sectors in South Korea showed a very 
positive result, the government could fully finished the recovery programs 
and pay back to the IMF only in three years. Unemployment rate decreased 
sharply, export started to continue, and banking system became healthier. In 
Indonesian case, the unemployment rate kept increasing to today, it reached 
over 9 percent. When crisis hit Korea and Indonesia, the economic indicator 













Indonesia Economic Indicator in the Crisis 
 
 
After several months IMF recovery prescription began to apply, 
South Korea GDP growth rate rose to a positive number, particularly after 
the year 2000, the GDP of South Korea began to reach above 0 percent, an 
evidence of such recovery of the economic growth. 
Graph 5.3 





In Indonesia the income per capita did not show positive number, 
however after 7 years of the crisis, government started to deal with the crisis 
and the economic growth began to increase. 
Graph 5.4 
Indonesia GDP Growth 
 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia (various years), Indonesian National Agency of 
Statistics (BPS) (www.bps.go.id).) 
 
Even though the economic condition on trade and growth were seen 
better year by year, however the number of poverty rate in Indonesia 
remained really high. See the table below 
Graph 5.5 




Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia (various years), Indonesian National Agency of 




Through the description and data in chapter four, we can see that the 
crisis that hit Asia in 1997 not only contributed to political transition in 
Indonesia, but this transition also produced some difficulties for the 
Indonesian government to address the objectives of economic recovery from 
the IMF. With new government system that was supposed to be under 
civilian control forced Indonesia to restore its economic condition over a 
short period, however this new government system, after many decades of 
rule under an authoritarian administration remained a weak political system 
throughout its judicial, parliaments and decision making process. Despite 
dealing with a new government with limited experience, the IMF 
approached by pushing more unrealistic programs, during the administration 
of new President Habibie. The IMF and the Indonesian government agreed 
to further signing more than a hundred new policies. Through these new 
policy actions, President Habibie followed the IMF Managing Director to 
publish new laws on banking, central banks, bankruptcy, and many other 
laws that were not prepared and created serious confusion for the next 
government who would implement them. 
Compared to South Korea, that did not have a serious political 
transition; the Indonesian government faced more obstacles since the 
transition from an authoritarian to democratic system created instability in 
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both economic and political sectors. More than 50 riots emerged as a 
consequence, and the emergence of new political parties appeared with 
several programs that were not based on public interest, but on a preference 
to get more public support in achieving personal goals to hold new 
governance in the next general election. Started from the military reform 
that was supposed to be reform due to its tight relationship with the previous 
government, however in reality, the new President still could not maximize 
its function to control the agenda of military reform. The Indonesian 
government kept using the dual functions of the armed forces to legalize its 
new administration. Government that should implement the good 
governance principles, again in the Indonesian case that time was not able to 
address it. 
In addition, the capability of the Indonesian government to provide a 
proper strategy was also one of the factors that made the recovery slower 
than that in Korea. With its new multi parties and weak parliaments, the 
decision making process took a longer time and ended with very 
complicated process. In a normal condition, governments need a long time 
to produce one policy to overcome such a crisis, however in the situation 
that there was chaos with instability in social, economic and politics, 
government faced more difficulties to achieve one voice to address the 
correct policy in order to resolve its crisis. Therefore, the economic recovery 





One of the world‟s most unforgettable economic crises took place in 
1997. It began with the collapsed of Thai Bath, spreading investor panic, 
leading to a massive withdrawal that caused a sudden financial crisis in 
neighboring countries, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Among those affected countries, South Korea, 
Indonesia and Thailand requested assistance from the IMF that year. 
Indonesia officially made a request on November 5, followed by South 
Korea in the end of November 1997. 
South Korea and the IMF signed the Three Years Stand-by 
Agreement and started to implement the letter of Intent on economic 
recovery programs. This letter of intent contained such programs focusing 
on restructuring policy on macroeconomic sectors, monetary and fiscal 
policies, banking restructuring programs, trade liberalization and 
restructuring on governance and corporate sectors. No different from South 
Korea, the government of Indonesia had similar programs based on the 
recommendation of the IMF.  
The programs started with the application of very tight monetary 
policy through a very high interest rate policy. As soon as the governments 
of both states announced the policy, the unexpected effect emerged. As 
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consequences, 11 business conglomerates in Korea went into bankruptcies, 
beginning with the collapsed of steel manufactures companies, followed by 
the collapsed of KIA, one of the biggest automobile companies in South 
Korea. With even higher interest rates than those in South Korea, the 
government of Indonesia announced an increase of interest rates to reach 80 
percent by the end of 1997 that caused national massive bankruptcies. Not 
only big companies, small and medium size firms also experienced 
insolvency. 
In South Korea, its government continued with restructuring 
corporate sectors since in the past decades the Korean governments had very 
tight relationship with business conglomerates. These tight ties created a 
corrupt system in the body of banks and companies. Governments used to 
fund their political campaign with the support of Chaebols, and on the other 
hand, Chaebols could easily access to the banks in obtain both domestic and 
foreign debt, one of the factors that created a weak economic system in 
Korea, and triggered the crisis. Governments ordered all companies, 
particularly big industrial companies, to audit their financial status, and thus 
reported to government institutions in order to have control of a healthy 
company system. These programs showed a really positive result for Korean 
companies right now, those companies have been competing to achieve 
global standard in order to get a good image in foreign market and keep the 
image inside the country.  
 
 １１２ 
In Indonesia, this policy was also implemented, especially as an 
attempt to cut government ties with banks, the banking system was really 
corrupt as the government used to fund their activities and personal interests 
through national banks, getting huge access to get foreign debt and used it 
for their political interest. Government made decisions based on the IMF 
prescription by closing 16 troubled banks by the end of 1997. However, 
unexpectedly, the effects spread to all citizens‟ confidence of national banks. 
In a short period people withdrew their money and moved it to foreign 
banks, creating a huge shock and another liquidity crisis. This economic 
downturn caused more crumbled economic crisis, people started to loss their 
trust on government‟s ability in overcoming the crisis, and banks had no 
enough money to operate, led to a devaluation of the Indonesian Rupiah as 
it dropped to under 14.000 per USD, induced double to triple increasing of 
basic goods and foods prices. Demonstrations began to break out all over 
the territory of Indonesia.  
Conflicts amongst political elites emerged as a consequence, the 
opposition party started to encourage young people to call for 
democratization for a better Indonesia. Several big riots took place; 
particularly in the capital city as student movements and democratic 
activists ordered the president to leave the position after over three decades 
ruled Indonesia with authoritarian system. Governments were seen as a 
institutions that were incapable of taking Indonesia out of the crisis, caused 
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by their nepotism, collusion, corruption in all government institutions both 
at a national and local level – most significantly in the armed forces, as the 
right hand of president Soeharto‟s that had served as his regime protector. 
The military body since the beginning of Soeharto‟s reign was given a 
special right to run its dual functions. On the one hand, they stood as a 
national defense institution and on the other they had a big influence and 
played a huge role in the national political process and its system. 
Soeharto‟s regime collapsed after thousands of university students 
expropriated the national legislature building on 20 May, 1998. Vice 
President Habibie continued to rule Indonesia and dealt with the impacts of 
financial crisis. However, the political reform in Indonesia faced many 
challenges and its obstacle since the military reform ended with an 
interdependency between new president Habibie and the armed forces, so 
called-TNI. 
The interdependency among them provided a crucial privilege for 
senior military actors maintaining their influence on a national political level 
and government institutions. They were permitted to adjust their own reform 
agenda, which was supposed to be civilian controlled. The deal brought 
several tasks for military forces to support President Habibie‟s campaign for 
1999 general election. In November 1998, TNI was requested to mobilize 
thousands of civilian demonstrators to back Habibie‟s plan to legalize his 
leadership in special session of People‟s Consultative Assembly. 
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Another political transition continued after Habibie was unable to 
win people‟s sympathy in the 1999 general election. Indonesia continued to 
have several political changes under the administrations of Wahid, 
Megawati and followed by Yudhoyono today. Indonesia kept addressing 
several reforms in the military sectors, government institutions, 
constitutions and its court. However, even today, its governments still have 
difficulties, mainly after the emergence of separatist groups and its loss of 
East Timor. Indonesia has more difficulties in implementing economic 
reforms since the governments do not have enough capability to address 
good governance system that is supposed to be transparent about how the 
policies and decisions are taken, accountability, has its capacity in creating 
governing body to be effective, and thus lack civilian control and are not 
clean of corruption.  
In the case of South Korea, its government did not have many 
challenges since there was no political transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic system. The government focused on the economic 
impacts on national business, industrial, trade, and how to restore the 
Korean Won. There was no big turmoil during the 1997-1998 crises as the 
South Korean government seemed to have strong capability in overcoming 
the Asian financial crisis through a recovery of its export rate, Korea has 
shown positive and high economic growth even until today. South Korea 
successfully recovered from the crisis in three years; however the 
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Indonesian governments still have much homework to fully recover from its 
effects, the unemployment rate that remained very high, number of poverty 
that couldn‟t be decreased and its political turmoil that still emerges today 
and should be a consideration of the Indonesian government for the next 
several years. 
This government with its new cabinet was not ready with all the 
complicated impacts of the crisis. Government, which should be an 
institution that produces appropriate recovery policies were not able to 
choose the best decision for overcoming the financial downturn. In normal 
conditions, bureaucracy usually takes a long period of time to create a 
program for the purpose of restoring a significant economic growth, and in 
the new cabinet after a long dictatorship; the government seemed not to be 
able to recover from its economic downfall. The emergence of new political 
parties in the new cabinet with its weak institution and constitution need 
more time to produce stability in economy and politics. Its government also 
faced some challenges since the new parliaments and political parties 
showed intense competition inside its new cabinet. The new parties went 
into competition to get higher support and become famous in front of its 
citizen, it forced them to produce a policy that was not based on national 
economic and political condition, and instead based on policy that can create 
more supporters.  
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Compared to South Korea, as an institution, the government of 
Indonesia did not have a good capacity and credibility to implement the 
economic and political reforms to adjust economic recovery. The biggest 
obstacle was the political turmoil that was caused by the political transition 
under a democratic system that was supposed to produce public interest; 
however the implementation found it dependent on new parliaments that 
were weak and unable to grasp the root causes that triggered the crisis. The 
government of South Korea, in a short period, built several institutions with 
its objective to recover from the crisis. In Indonesia, its government also 
established several institutions whose functions were to control private 
assets and restore its economy; however with new parliaments and political 
parties these institutions were seen as targets to get access to financial 
resources.  
 
Besides that, after the three years IMF programs were applied to 
both countries, we could see that the IMF suggested the same policies to 
both countries without monitoring and looking to each country‟s economic 
and political conditions at the first stage. Most of the programs that they 
applied to Indonesia were much more strict compared to the economic 
recommendation in South Korea. This is a crucial requirement before the 
government addresses any program. Researcher sees this as a fatal mistake 
that makes the economic recovery more difficult to be achieved. All of these 
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reasons were behind the unsuccessfulness of the Indonesian government‟s in 
overcoming the 1997-1998 crisis compared to South Korea; however the 
most crucial cause was the political transition from three decade of 
authoritarian regime to democracy that brought instability in both political 
and economic sectors during that period, which become the factor that 
influenced capacity and capability of Indonesian government in resolving 
the economic downturn.  
This condition caused many instabilities in national level in 
Indonesia, creating more difficulties for Indonesian government in 
implementing the economic prescription. The emergence of political 
conflicts inside new cabinet and political elites made the decision making 
process took longer time and couldn‟t be maximized. Many numbers of 
separatism, local conflicts and riots in almost all territory of Indonesia also 
influenced the performance of its governments. The government of 
Indonesia in one hand must face the impacts of democratization and in 
another hand, must be efficient and fast in producing right solutions for the 
instability of economics and politics. Thus, the new and inexperienced 
government was unable to overcome all the aftereffects of 1997-1998 crises. 
This paper also validates that the theory of institutional capacity, where the 
government should have its capability and credibility to choose an 
appropriate policy that should be based on the principles of good 
governance in order to solve the economic crisis and produce a significant 
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1997 금융위기는 태국에서 타이 “bath” 평가절하로 인해 
발생하였으며 대핚민국과 인도네시아를 비롯하여 동남아시아와 
동아시아의 인국에게 큰 영향을 끼쳤습니다. 즉 1997 금융위기는 
대핚민국과 인도네시아 경제에 대핚 대외신뢰도 손실과 대량 자본 
유출을 일으켰습니다. 그렇기 때문에 대핚민국과 인도네시아 정부는 
국제통화기금(IMF)의 지원을 받아 거시경제, 통화제도, 재정제도, 
은행제도, 관리개선계획과 지배구조조정전략 개발에 중점을 
두었습니다. IMF 계획은 경제를 극복하고 경제에 대핚 대외신뢰를 
얻기 위하여 실시됐습니다.   
그런데 대핚민국과 인도네시아는 경제적인 그리고 정치적인 
여건들이 다르기 때문에 극복과정이 달랐습니다. 극복정책이 
시행핚지 3 년 이후 대핚민국은 인도네시아와 비하여 많은 성공을 
해왔습니다. 즉 인도네시아는 대핚민국과 달리 IMF 의 극복정책을 
실시했음에도 불구하고 1997 금융위기에서 완전 극복핛 수 있는 
여건을 가지지 못했습니다. 1997 금융위기관련해서는 논란이 많은 
걸로 알려져 있는데 이 논문은 대핚민국과 인도네시아가 
1997 금육위기에서 극복하기 위해 실행해 온 IMF 프로그램 또핚 
과정에 대핚 차이를 분석했습니다.  
 
 １２７ 
연구결과는 인도네시아가 1997 금융위기에서 극복핛 때 사회적 
또핚 정치적 불안정성이 사회적 역량에 많은 영향을 미쳤기 때문에 
많은 어려움을 겪어 온 것으로 나타났습니다. 이 결과와 비교연구를 
통하여 사회적 역량과 지배구조 관련된 이론을 세웠습니다.  
 
 
